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The Practice of Law
by Out-of-State Attorneys*
I. INTRODUCTION
Our nation is a unit economically and socially, with goods and people
moving freely across the country. Yet legally it is fragmented with fifty
states and their laws operative within one nation. Voltaire said of the
France of his time that a traveler changed laws as often as he changed
horses. We surpass France with its provinces of the Old Regime. The
American cross-country traveller changes his law a dozen times without
changing his coach or his plane.1
Multi-state legal problems are commonplace for the American at-
torney. In meeting the legal needs of the business and personal lives
of his clients, he is confronted daily with laws of the several compo-
nents of our federal system. Out-of-state litigation and office work
situations constantly demand his presence in jurisdictions in which
he is not admitted to practice. Yet present admission rules make his
appearance in such litigation difficult at best, and render such office
work virtually impossible. These restrictions on the interstate practice
of law have become intolerable-in a legal, if not always a practical,2
sense-in the context of our economy. Their re-examination is the
subject of this note.
The broad issue presented is: when may a foreign attorney be
admitted to the practice of law in a local jurisdiction?3 An attorney
*The author of this note was co-recipient of the Dean's Award, given for the best
senior dissertation submitted by a member of the graduating class.
1. Cheatham, Draft Foreword, proposed symposium on vertical conflict of laws, p. 1
(Vanderbilt University School of Law 1966). The symposium is scheduled for publi-
cation in 21 VAND. L. REv. issue 4 (May, 1968).
2. Admission restrictions may not be enforced in many situations concerning the
foreign attorney. See 31 S. CAL. L. RF-v. 416, 420 (1958) (citing bar association
questionnaire noting probability of non-enforcement based on hardship to clients in
Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, New
York City and Milwaukee). But see text accompanying note 132 infra. See also 78
HI- v. L. REv. 1651 (1965).
3. The various subissues presented restate the central issue with varied characteriza-
tions of the terms "foreign attorney," "practice law," and "local jurisdiction." This
central issue is raised most frequently by clients as a defense to attorneys' suits to
recover for services rendered. See, e.g., Spivak v. Sachs, 16 N.Y.2d 163, 211 N.E.2d
329, 263 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1965). Bar association suits to enjoin local practice by the
foreign attorney, or for contempt, are not uncommon. See In re Bercu, 299 N.Y. 728,
87 N.E.2d 451 (1949) (injunction and contempt proceeding); Application of New
York County Lawyers' Ass'n, 207 Misc. 698, 139 N.Y.S.2d 714 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (con-
tempt proceeding). Criminal prosecutions are also available. See, e.g., N.Y. PEN. LA%
§§ 270, 272 (McKinney 1944, Supp. 1966) (misdemeanor). Findings of fact made
in local jurisdictions may be the bases for disciplinary proceedings in foreign jurisdic-
tions. See Note, The Imposition of Disciplinary Measures for the Misconduct of Attor-
neys, 52 CoLuTm. L. Rzv. 1039 (1952); of. In re Kent, 39 N.J. 114, 187 A.2d 718
(1963) (N.J. attorney reprimanded for unethical practice in Pa.). For a discussion of
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is "foreign" when he may not legally practice law within a jurisdiction
without fulfilling certain conditions in addition to those he met for
the privilege of holding himself out as an attorney. The admission
problem of the foreign attorney would be academic, of course, if he
could qualify as a local attorney without substantial difficulty. Un-
fortunately, such is not the case, and meeting the admission require-
ments in each necessary jurisdiction is quite impractical,4 especially
where the needs of the foreign attorney's clients touch several states.
Without the alternative of admission to practice, then, the foreign
attorney must find other means by which he may be permitted to
practice in the local jurisdiction.
To focus the discussion on the foreign attorney, certain assumptions
have been made. The practitioner with whom we shall be concerned
will always be a lawyer. Thus, problems of the lay practitioner are
outside the breadth of this note. The foreign attorney also will gen-
erally be assumed to be "practicing law" within the meaning of the
local law. For the most part, then, no examination of what the prac-
tice of law consists will be necessary. Further, practice of foreign
attorneys before administrative tribunals and other specialized or non-
adversarial practice will not be discussed directly. Finally, no detailed
consideration will be given to the effects on the attorney of non-
compliance with admission standards.
II. AUTHOmTATIVE SouncEs FOR ADMISSION OF FOREIGN ATTomExys
The sources of authority to prescribe or limit rules governing the
the ethical considerations involved, see Opinions of the Committee on Professional
Ethics, The Practice of Law Across State Lines, 53 A.B.A.J. 353 (1967).
4. The usual qualification for a "local attorney" is that he be a member of the local
bar. Membership is usually available for foreign attorneys without examination, but
additional requirements of residency and active practice for a stated period make bar
admission impractical for the usual interstate practitioner. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE ANN. § 6062(d) (West 1962) (three month residency); 6062(e) (active and
substantial practice for four of prior six years); Ky. CT. APP. R. 2.110 (active practice
for five of seven preceding years); MicH. STAT. ArN. § 27A-946 (1962) (three of five
preceding years' active practice and Michigan office, with intent to establish active
practice); N.Y. CT. Ap,. R. VII-1 (five years of foreign practice and six months
actual residency). Admission to the bar, however, does not always ensure that an
attorney may practice without satisfying other conditions. He may be required to
maintain an offlce or reside within the jurisdiction in order to practice without applying
for permission. See S.D.N.Y. R. 4 (office within district or E.D.N.Y. for court appear-
ance); KAN. Sup. CT. R. 54, interpreted in Martin v. Walton, 368 U.S. 25 (1961)
(requiring association of local attorney for court appearance of Kansas attorney
regularly practicing in Missouri). See generally Note, Attorneys: Interstate and Federal
Practice, 80 HIv. L. RIv. 1711 (1967). Where an attorney is from a foreign country,
bar admission is virtually foreclosed by requirements of American citizenship. See,
e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE ANN. § 6062(a) (West 1962); N.Y. CT. Ap,. R. VII-I.c.
For a discussion of the admission problems of the international lawyer in a foreign
country, see Note, Foreign Branches of Law Firms: The Development of Lawyers to
Handle International Practice, 80 HArav. L. REv. 1284 (1967).
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admission of foreign attorneys can be identified on two levels-that
of the federal system, and that of the separation of powers. At the
federal system level, state and federal constitutional law establish
outer limits for the application of state and federal admission rules,
and state and federal law are the primary relevant sources of such
rules. Generally, state law governs admission to state practice, and
federal law governs admission to federal practice.5 Under certain
circumstances, admission rules are also prescribed for state practice by
federal constitutional law.6 In addition to these prescribing functions,
federal and state law perform significant limiting functions.7
Identification of these federal system sources, however, does not
by itself explain the allocation of admission power among the parts
of the federal system. The "practice" which is to be governed by
rules arising from these sources must be defined. The separation of
the state from the federal is easily accomplished in litigation practice,
where the nature of the tribunal is conclusive." State and federal
practice cannot so easily be distinguished, however, in office practice
situations, where the locus of performance is not helpful. Content of
the law practiced is probably the significant differential, but federal
exercise of power in this area has been limited thus far.9
The separation-of-powers level of authoritative sources reflects the
distribution of federal and state rule-prescribing powers among the
branches of the federal and state governments. Within the federal
government, the executive branch has authority to deal with practice
before its administrative agencies; the legislative branch can control
practice before its committees; and the judicial branch has control
5. "The several states, so the tenth amendment to the Constitution provides, are the
residuary keepers of the governmental powers neither delegated to the nation, prohibited
to the states, nor reserved to the people. In the absence of such delegation, prohibition,
or reservation, the law applicable to the legal profession is state law." Cheatham, The
Reach of Federal Action Over the Profession of Law, 18 STAN. L. Rv. 1288, 1290
(1966).
6. Admission of foreign attorneys to state practice as of right is discussed in Parts
IV(a) (2) and V(B) infra.
7. For a discussion of the varieties of federal action, including proscribing and
limiting law, see Cheatham, supra note 5, at 1290.
8. By virtue of the supremacy clause of the federal constitution, state admission
rules are not binding in the federal courts. In re McCue, 211 Cal. 57, 293 P. 47
(1930) (state court refrained from applying state rules to preparation for federal liti-
gation). Cf. note 166 infra. See also note 94 infra.
9. Concurrent federal power over office practice may have been recognized in Sperry
v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963). The Supreme Court noted that a lay practitioner
licensed by the federal Office of Patents was not subject to state unauthorized practice
rules in preparing opinions as to patentability and in holding himself out as a patent
specialist. 373 U.S. at 402 n.47. However, the Court also used more limiting language,
stating that "registration in the Patent Office does not authorize the general practice
of patent law, but sanctions only the performance of those services which are reasonably
necessary and incident to the preparation and prosecution of patent applications." 373
U.S. at 386.
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over admission to practice before its courts. The allocation of federal
power over office practice matters concerning federal law is not yet
settled.'0 Within the states, there is a division of authority as to
whether the legislature or the judiciary possesses ultimate authority
over admission of attorneys."
III. POLICIES RELEVANT TO ADMISSION OF FOREIGN ATTORNEYs
The public interest12 in representation by qualified counsel suggests
the desirability of a policy favoring admission of foreign attorneys.
Conflicting conceptions of this policy, however, are maintained by
the interested public of the local jurisdiction and that of the entire
country. The former, or local public, is said to have a strong interest
in restricting admission of foreign attorneys, based on the need for
protection from unethical and incompetent legal services.'3 The latter,
or interstate public, has, on the other hand, an interest in the inter-
10. See text accompanying notes 146-56 infra.
11. The usual state rule places control over bar admission in the legislature, and
control over admission pro hac vice in the judiciary. See, e.g., Freeling v. Tucker, 49
Idaho 475, 289 P. 85 (1930); In re Mock, 146 Cal. 378, 80 P. 64 (1905). The inherent
power of the highest state court occasionally governs all admission to the practice of
law. See, e.g., State ex rel. Green v. Brown, 173 Ohio St. 114, 180 N.E.2d 157 (1962);
NJ. CONST. art. 6, § 2, ff 3. Qualifications for admission pro hac vice as well as bar
admission are controlled by the legislature in some states, with further rule-making
powers delegated to the courts by statute. See, e.g., Bradley v. Sudler, 174 Kan. 293,
255 P.2d 650 (1953); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-103, 7-104 (1964); KAN. Sup. CT. R. 41,
54, cited in Martin v. Walton, 368 U.S. 25, 26 (1961).
12. Restrictive admission rules rest solely on the need for protection of the public
interest Appell v. Reiner, 43 NJ. 313, 316, 204 A.2d 146, 148 (1964). Protection of
the bar is not a valid consideration. See Darby v. Mississippi Bar Examiners, 185 So.
2d 684, 687 (Miss. 1966); People v. Alfani, 227 N.Y. 334, 339, 125 N.E. 671, 673
(1919). Economic protection of local lawyers could only be valid insofar as the in-
creased competition from foreign attorneys lowered the local bar's ethical standards.
See 78 HARV. L. REv. 1651, 1652 (1965). "If it is this rationale that underlies the
protectionist argument, however, there is an inconsistency with the unrestricted
admission of residents who meet prescribed standards. If the state wishes to guarantee
that local attorneys will have income sufficient to make unethical conduct unattractive,
it would seem more logical to achieve this aim through restricted entry provisions
applicable to all potential practitioners. Furthermore, to the extent that out-of-state
attorneys would actually reduce the amount of local business, the reduction would
not seem likely to affect those lawyers most susceptible to economic pressures. The
more important threat to low-income attorneys is probably posed by nonlawyers, such
as real estate agents and accountants, who often render legal advice as an incident to
other services." Id.
13. "The power of the State to provide for the general welfare of its people authorizes
it to prescribe all such regulations as in its judgment will secure or tend to secure
them against the consequences of ignorance and incapacity as well as of deception and
fraud." Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889) (regulation of medical
profession). See Spivak v. Sachs, supra note 3. "The [unauthorized practice] statute
aims to protect our citizens against the dangers of legal representation and advice
given by persons not trained, examined and licensed for such work, whether they be
laymen or lawyers from other jurisdictions." Id. at 168, 211 N.E.2d at 331, 263
N.Y.S.2d at 956,
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state availability of legal services, and thus in the freedom of move-
ment of attorneys from one jurisdiction to another.14
The balance between these two conflicting forces is presently
weighted heavily in favor of the local interests. But recent events,
notably decisions in the New Jersey Supreme Court15 and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,16 indicate that the
interests of the interstate public are gaining new prominence. It is
the thesis of this note that this trend is wise and important, and that
the substantial reduction of restrictions on admission of foreign at-
torneys should be encouraged.
Other policies which affect the formulation and application of ad-
mission rules concerning the foreign attorney include those basic to
the rights granted by the federal and state constitutions. Federal
constitutional policies behind, for example, the right to counsel 7 and
the privileges and immunities, 18 full faith and credit,
19 due process, 2°
equal protection2 ' and supremacy clauses22 all may have application
14. See Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 364 F.2d 161, 170 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 987 (1966). The clearest confrontation between these two policies occurred
in the case of Appell v. Reiner, 81 N.J. Super. 229, 195 A.2d 311 (1963), ret'd, 43
N.J. 313, 204 A.2d 146 (1964), where the New Jersey Supreme Court cast aside the
restrictive local policies advocated by the lower court in favor of the liberal federal
system policy of availability of interstate legal services. New York has recognized the
possibility of such an exception, but has yet to create it. See Spivak v. Sachs, supra
note 3 at 168, 211 N.E.2d at 331, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 956. See also text accompanying
notes 136-42 infra.
15. Appell v. Reiner, supra note 14 (New York attorney permitted to conduct New
Jersey office practice because of public interest in single counsel for substantially inter-
related New York-New Jersey transactions).
16. Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., supra note 14 (California lawyer permitted to
practice in federal court in New York without admission to bar of court, on privileges
and immunities of client to be represented where federal claim or defense involved).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See Cooper v. Hutchison, 184 F.2d 119, 122 (3d Cir.
1950) (state capital prosecution); United States v. Bergamo, 154 F.2d 31 (3d Cir.
1946) (federal counterfeiting prosecution). For a general discussion of the constitu-
tional considerations, see Note, Retaining Out-of-State Counsel: The Evolution of a
Federal Right, 67 CoLum. L. REv. 731 (1967).
18. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. See Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., supra
note 14, at 170.
19. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1. Explicit use of this clause has not occurred in an
admission case, but the Second Circuit has spoken of the recognition of a "lawyer
licensed by 'public act of any other state," which is full faith and credit language.
Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., supra note 14, at 170. Broader means of employing
this provision are suggested in Part IV(A) (2) infra.
20. U.S. CONST. art. V, amend. XIV, § 1. Substantive due process was suggested
in early cases, but is now generally disregarded. See Dent v. West Virginia, supra
note 13, at 122. Procedural due process has been urged as the basis for a right to
counsel of one's own choice. See Cooper v. Hutchison, supra note 17, at 121-22.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See Martin v. Walton, supra note 4, at 28-29
(dissenting opinion).
22. U.S. CONST. art. VI, el. 2. See In re McCue, supra note 8, at 66, 293 P. at 52
(federal district court practice); Cowen v. Calabrese, 230 Cal. App. 2d 870, 872-73,
41 Cal. Rptr. 441, 443 (1964) (federal bankruptcy court practice). Both cases spoke
[ VOL. 201280
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to state and federal admission of foreign attorneys. In litigation prac-
tice, there may be a further policy of promoting administrative con-
venience with respect to such considerations as service of process and
the procuring of attorneys at the call of the docket;23 this interest
argues, of course, for restrictions on admission of foreign attorneys.
The identification of each of these policies, combined with an under-
standing of the relevant authoritative sources, should provide a help-
ful guide for the evaluation of the rules governing admission of foreign
attorneys.
IV. AmcnssioN To LIGATION PBRA CE
An attorney desiring to represent a litigant generally cannot do so
without meeting certain prerequisites. One type of such prerequisites
entitles an attorney to engage in litigation practice without judicial
permission; that is, to practice as a "local" attorney. These prerequisites
vary from mere admission to the bar of the jurisdictions to further
requirements of residency in the state,25 county,26 or judicial district0
7
of the court.2 A second type of prerequisites exists for the non-local
or "foreign" attorney. This section of the note will examine these
of the state's failure to regulate, but the supremacy clause would seem to have been
the authoritative source. See also Sperry v. Florida, supra note 9, at 384, 403.
23. Martin v. Walton, supra note 4, at 27 (dissenting opinion).
24. See, e.g., N.Y. JunicLrAY LAW § 90.1.a (McKinney Supp. 1967). The New York
courts apparently have not added a requirement of residency at the time of practice,
although residence is required for bar admission. Compare In re Arnold's Will, 125
N.Y.S.2d 782, 784 (Sur. Ct. 1953), with N.Y. CT. Ape. R. VII-1.
25. See, e.g., Anderson v. Coolin, 27 Idaho 334, 338, 149 P. 286, 289 (1915).
26. See Letaw v. Smith, 223 Ark. 638, 268 S.W.2d 3 (1954) (county residence
requirement invalid under state law); Arthaud v. Griffin, 202 Iowa 462, 210 N.W. 540
(1926) (county residence requirement upheld). Pennsylvania formerly required county
residency and maintenance of a county law office for appearances without association
of local counsel. See Application of Christy, 362 Pa. 347, 67 A.2d 85, cert. denied,
338 U.S. 869 (1949) (county requirements not violative of due process of law); In re
Rules of Court of Pike County, 41 Pa. D. & C. 223, 54 (C.P. Pike County, 1941)
(court can require bona fide residence in county for both admission to county court
and continuation of privilege of local practice); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1602 (1962).
Amendments in 1965 and 1966, however, have eliminated these conditions, and have
made admission to the state bar sufficient for an attorney to appear in any county. court
without association of other counsel. See PA. Sup. CT. R. 14.
27. See Bradley v. Sudler, supra note 11 (associate counsel must be resident of and
maintain law office in judicial district of the court). Kansas now requires only that
associate counsel be members of the state bar. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 7-104 (1964);
KAw. Sup. CT. R. 54.
28. Some jurisdictions have also added a condition regarding maintenance of a law
office within the state, county, or judicial district. See Bradley v. Sudler, supra note
11; Application of Christy, supra note 26. Some also require continued regular practice
within the state's courts. See Martin v. Davis, 187 Kan. 473, 357 P.2d 782 (1960),
aff'd sub nom. Martin v. Walton, .supra note 4 (interpreting KAN. Sup. CT. R. 54
to require association of local counsel by Kansas attorneys regularly practicing out of
state).
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prerequisites, and their applicability to state and federal litigation.
Litigation practice is "practice of law" as regulated by court rules
and statutes. It most obviously includes participation in proceedings
before judicial tribunals. It also includes participation in the prep-
aration for such proceedings, which extends to pre-litigation research
as well as formal pre-trial conferences and deposition proceedings.
2 1
Generally, there is no quantitative test for classification of work as
litigation practice;30 any amount of such practice will constitute litiga-
tion as proscribed by unauthorized practice rules. For preparation to
come within a state's prohibition, however, it must take place in the
jurisdiction in which the cause of action is pending.31
A. Admission to State Litigation Practice
1. Practice with Permission of the Court-Pro Hac Vice. (a) Rules
for State Admission Pro Hac Vice.-The foreign attorney w, ho has
obtained permission of a court to appear in a particular litigation is
said to have been admitted pro hac vice; that is, this attorney is per-
mitted to practice only in one court for the occasion of a single law-
suit.32 Admission pro hac vice is generally within the discretion of
the court,33 but that discretion is often not operative until various pre-
29. See In re McCue, supra note 8, at 68, 293 P. at 52 (deposition outside of court
was "in fact a proceeding in court"); Tuppela v. Mathison, 291 F. 728 (9th Cir. 1923)
(preparation is litigation practice).
30. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 46, § 42 (1958) ("any act" in connection with court
proceedings). This test is in contrast to that for office practice, which exempts isolated
or incidental practice from the operation of unauthorized practice statutes. Cf. Spivak
v. Sachs, supra note 3, at 166-68, 211 N.E.2d at 331, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 955-56 (single
document for small fee or no fee is not law practice).
31. See Spivak v. Sachs, supra note 3 (office practice rules applied to New York
preparation for Connecticut litigation); ALA. CODE tit. 46, § 42(a) (1958).
32. Pro hac vice literally means "for this turn" or "for this one particular occasion."
BLACK'S LAW DiCTONARY 1363 (4th ed. 1951). This form of admission has also been
termed "leave ex gratia for the occasion." See Freeling v. Tucker, supra note 11 at
479, 289 P. 86; Tuppela v. Mathison, supra note 29, at 730. The custom was appar-
ently recognized in England as early as 1629. See Thursby v. Warren, 79 Eng. Rep. 738
(C.P. 1629), cited in Cooper v. Hutchison, supra note 17, at 122. And it was in
general use in the United States by 1876. See In re Mosness, 39 Wis. 509 (1876),
cited in Cooper v. Hutchison, supra note 17, at 122; Farley, Attorney Admissions From
Other Jurisdictions, in Sunvs- OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, BAR EXAMINATIONS AND
REQUIREMENTS FOR ADm~sSION TO Tm BAR 165 (1952) ("Practically all states permit
an attorney from another jurisdiction to appear pro hac vice . ... "). The general
form of the rule was stated by the California Supreme Court as follows: "It is common
practice, and one sustained by general usage in all of the states of this Union, we
believe, to permit upon request an attorney holding a license to practice law from one
state to appear in the courts of a sister state and there take part in the trial of an action
pending in said courts." In re McCue, supra note 8, at 66, 293 P. at 51-52. In its
form of pro hac vice, New York has explicitly recognized that such admission may be
extended to attorneys from foreign countries. See N.Y. CT. App. R. VII-4.
33. See ILL. Sup. CT. R. 707 ("foreign attorneys in isolated cases"), interpreted in
Robinson v. Hunt, 211 La. 1019, 1044-46, 31 So. 2d 197, 201 (1947); N.Y. CT. App.
R. VII-4. But this discretion does not continue once the lawyer has been admitted,
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requisites are met by the attorney seeking admission.3 These pre-
requisites are usually embodied in a statute35 or court rule3 6 [herein-
after, "statute" will be used to designate both] that requires the for-
eign attorney to associate local counsel before admission pro hac vice
will be granted. These rules vary according to the characterizations
given the terms "foreign" 37 and "local '38 attorneys.
At that time, he is said to have the same rights and duties as a local lawyer, and thus
cannot be arbitrarily removed without denying his client his constitutional rights. See
Cooper v. Hutchison, supra note 17, at 123 (defendants denied due process when
foreign attorneys admitted pro hac vice were not permitted to represent defendants on
remand of murder prosecution). Cf. Faughnan v. City of Elizabeth, 58 N.J.L. 309, 33
A. 212 (1895) (attorney who became nonresident during course of trial could
properly continue representation).
34. As of 1952, sixteen states and the District of Columbia had such prerequisites.
See Farley, supra note 32, at 165, 169 n.39. Depending upon a state's view of the
judicial role in admissions pro hac vice, fulfillment of the admission prerequisites may
give the applicant foreign attorney a right to pro hac vice admission. See LA. SuP. CT.
R. XIV and LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 37:214-15 (1964) (fulfillment of statutory as-
sociation or reciprocity requirements is sole condition for admission). Where control
over admission rests exclusively with the judiciary, though, courts probably have dis-
cretion to deny admission despite fulfillment of any prerequisites. See Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 8666 (1956) (association statute with condition that applicant be "of good moral
character and familiar with the ethics, principles, practices, customs and usages of the
legal profession" of Mississippi). Reciprocity pro hac vice statutes are also common.
See, e.g., FLA. ApP. R. 2.3.b; Mo. Supp. CT. R. 9.01; LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 37:214-16
(1964); Farley, supra note 32, at 165 (citing Utah and Idaho; the listing of Idaho
appears inaccurate in light of IDAHo R. Civ. P. 11(a) requiring signature of resident
attorney on all pleadings).
35. See, e.g., IDaho CoDE § 5-701 (1948), and IDAHO R. Civ. P. 11(a) (pleadings
must be signed by at least one resident attorney); LA. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 37:214
(1964) (association of resident attorney required in absence of reciprocity with foreign
state).
36. See, e.g., KAN. Sup. CT. R. 54.
37. Three types of qualifications may be found in the statutes that produce varying
characterizations of the "foreign" attorney. These concern residency, bar admission,
and nature of foreign practice. In some jurisdictions, applicability of the association
statute turns strictly on the residency of the foreign attorney; that is, nonresident
attorneys, whether or not admitted to the local state bar, must associate a resident mem-
ber of the local bar before they may appear pro hac vice. See, e.g., IDAHo CODE § 5-701
(1948), and IDAHO R. Crv. P. 11(a); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 7-104 (1949) (non-residency
one of several qualifications). Association has even been required for non-resident
attorneys admitted and practicing in the state. See Taylor v. Taylor, 185 Kan. 324,
342 P.2d 190 (1959). Other states require association of local counsel only for attorneys
not admitted to the local bar; residency is not a material consideration. See, e.g., In re
New Jersey Refrigerating Co., 96 N.J.Eq. 431, 126 A. 174 (1924) (apparently citing
New Jersey rule of court). Kansas defines the "foreign attorney" as one who is
"regularly practicing outside of this state." See KAN. Sup. CT. R. 54. This rule was
held to have been properly applied to a resident Kansas attorney, who regularly
practiced in Missouri. See Martin v. Walton, supra note 4, at 27 (dissenting opinion).
38. The characterization of the local "attorney" to be associated also is varied in
the state rules of court and statutes. The universal qualification for the local attorney
is that he be a member of the local state bar, which in some jurisdictions is the sole
criterion. See, e.g., In re New Jersey Refrigerating Co., supra note 37, at 435, 126 A.
at 175. Other states require that the associated attorney be a resident, usually of the
state, but occasionally of either the county or the judicial district where the court is
sitting. See, e.g., Letaw v. Smith, 223 Ark. 638, 268 S.W.2d 3 (1954) (county resi-
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(b) Policies Behind State Association Requirements.-Association
court rules and statutes are peculiar in that they apply only to litiga-
tion practice. They would appear first to have been passed to guard
the public against the danger of over-use of the pro hac vice power
to the detriment of the ethical standards of state practice. Associ-
ation of local counsel was to be the means to effect more direct con-
trol over the performance of legal services by foreign attorneys.
39
Since some states exempt from service of process attorneys within
the state solely for judicial proceedings,4 there probably is some need
dency requirement violated state law; state residency proper qualification); Bradley v.
Sudler, supra note 11 (judicial district residency upheld; now revised by KAN. Sup. CT.
R. 54 to require only that associate reside within state); Meyer v. Brinsky, 129 Ohio
St., 371, 195 N.E. 702 (1935) (county residency requirement invalid; state residency is
correct qualification); Arthaud v. Griflfn, 202 Iowa 462, 210 N.W. 540 (1926) (county
residency is valid requirement for local associate); Anderson v. Coolin, 27 Idaho 334,
149 P. 286 (1915) (state residency); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37:214 (1964) (state
residency). A further qualification of the local associate is that he maintain an office
within the state, county or judicial district. See, e.g., Bradley v. Sudler, supra note 11
(office within judicial district).
39. See Anderson v. Coolin, supra note 38. "This [association requirement] is
intended to provide for the employment of a resident attorney of this state, who shall
be held primarily responsible by, and answerable to, the courts of this state for all
proceedings had in connection with the litigation before the courts. The employment
of resident attorneys under this section is not to be considered as a mere subterfuge,
or that there is a compliance with the spirit of said [association requirement], where
an arrangement is made that the name of an attorney may be used as an accommodation
only. The employment must be bona fide and in good faith. Courts will look to
resident counsel in the first instance, and require at their hands the same careful
consideration and attention to the business that is intrusted to their care, when
associated with counsel of sister states or territories, as if they were conducting such
cases alone." Anderson v. Coolin, supra note 38, at 340, 149 P. at 289. Another reason
given for association statutes is that they are "conducive to convenient and orderly
procedure" in that they ease problems of service of papers on foreign attorneys. See
Arthaud v. Griffin, supra note 38, at 464, 210 N.W. at 541.
40. There is no agreement as to the immunity of foreign attorneys. In Lamb v.
Schmitt, 285 U.S. 222 (1932), the privilege was denied to a non-resident attorney in
order to restore to the court part of the fund in controversy which his client had
transferred to him. The Supreme Court said that, "The test is whether the immunity
itself, if allowed, would so obstruct judicial administration in the very cause for the
protection of which it is invoked as to justify withholding it. That, as we have said,
depends here upon the nature of the proceeding in which the service is made and
its relation to the principal suit, both of which are disclosed by the pleadings." Id. at
228. The immunity was also denied a non-resident attorney in Pitman v. Cunningham,
100 N.H. 49, 118 A.2d 884 (1955), where the court seemed to establish a rebuttable
presumption against immunity. "In the absence of some definite public benefit to be
gained by the extension of the privilege to nonresident attorneys, we refuse to adopt
it in 1955 merely because the privilege existed at the time of Blackstone." Id. at 52,
118 A.2d at 886. "[Wle are unable to see bow in modem day practice the service
of process on nonresident attorneys can be said to interfere with the dignity and
authority of the court and administrative agency or with the performance of their
duties." Id. at 51-52, 118 A.2d at 885. But see Hoffman v. Bay Circuit Judge, 113
Mich. 109, 71 N.W. 480 (1897), and Ada Dairy Prods. v. Superior Court, 258 P.2d
939 (Okla. 1953), both recognizing immunity for the foreign attorney. See also State
ex rel. Johnson v. Tautges, Rerat & Welch, 146 Neb. 439, 20 N.W.2d 232 (1945).
If the trend is toward denying the privilege for voluntary appearances, see A. Eimr-
for participation by an attorney subject to the jurisdiction of the
court. This exemption, though, probably extends only to civil service
of process, and jurisdiction over the non-resident attorney for criminal
acts and for contempt of court could likely be found in his appear-
ance in court.41 Furthermore, the need for control is significantly
lessened in litigation practice, which is subject to the constant scrutiny
of the court.
Assuming that control is to some extent a valid justification for
association statutes, some such statutes go beyond merely meeting
this need. Non-resident attorneys admitted to the local bar, for ex-
ample, need not associate resident counsel to be within the court's
control. Such attorneys probably waive their privilege as non-residents
by accepting admission to the local bar, and thus can be stripped of
their privilege to practice in the state without any jurisdictional
issues.4 Further, they can undoubtedly be denied attorney's fees in
the state, they should be denied fees in other states, and they are
probably subject to civil and criminal liabilities for their acts.43
If partial justification for association statutes is control through the
local associate attorney, attention should be given to the qualifications
of that local attorney. Residence within the state would seem to be
the only valid requirement. Certainly jurisdiction does not stop at
county or judicial district borders, so rules requiring such residence
cannot be explained upon the basis of control over the bar. Develop-
ing a statute solely on the policy of control, then, we might find some
ZWEG, CoNFLiCr OF LAWS § 31, at 108 (1962), non-resident attorneys will lose all
immunity from civil service of process. See generally Ray, Privilege of Non-Resident
Attorney from Service of Civil Process, 17 Ky. L.J. 197 (1929).
41. The immunity of parties, witnesses and attorneys from service of process was
originally based on a fear of arrest and imprisonment. See Ray, supra note 40, at 198.
Separate rules grew up when civil service of process came into general use. See Pitman
v. Cunningham, supra note 40, at 51, 118 A.2d at 885 (distinguishing arrest from civil
service). Criminal acts and actions in contempt of court, however, seem unrelated to
any justification for the immunity, and should permit service on and arrest of foreign
attorneys if necessary.
42. "When admitted to the Bar, attorneys at law become answerable to the rules and
discipline of the court in all matters of order and procedure and to the supervision
and control of the practice of law not in conflict with the constitution." Martin v. Davis,
supra note 28, at 480, 357 P.2d at 788, aff' sub nom. Martin v. Walton, supra note 4.
43. New York expressly prohibits the granting of fees, see N.Y. PEN. LA-w § 272
(McKinney 1944), and imposes criminal liability, N.Y. PFN. LAw §§ 270, 272
(McKinney 1944), for unauthorized practice. Prosecutions probably are also available
for contempt. Cf. In re Bercu, 299 N.Y. 728, 87 N.E.2d 451 (1949) (office practice
case). The foreign attorney also is liable to his client for negligence. See Degen v.
Steinbrink, 212 App. Div. 477, 195 N.Y.S. 810 (1922). The lawyer's home bar as
well as may reprimand him for his out-of-state wrongdoing. See In re Kent, 39 N.J.
114, 187 A.2d 718 (1963). Some form of interstate cooperation in control of attorneys
has also been suggested. See Note, The Imposition of Disciplinary Measures for the




small justification for requiring non-resident attorneys not admitted
to the local bar to associate local counsel residing within the state.
A second policy justification which might be advanced for associ-
ation statutes is the preservation of the intellectual standards of the
bar. With pro hac vice permitting foreign attorneys in the local courts,
the states could thereby protect the public from practice below the
standards of the local bar. The local associate could provide expertise
in local substantive law and rules of practice and procedure. There
is considerable doubt that the substantive knowledge of the local at-
torney, however, would be of significant benefit to the client or the
foreign attorney. First, substantive law generally has followed paral-
lel developments in the country, and the foreign lawyer would under-
stand any conflicting lines of decision and could readily research the
local law to determine the rule of the particular state. Second, foreign
attorneys representing interstate corporations are often specialists in
their field, and as such cannot be expected to gain appreciably by
association with a general practitioner of the local jurisdiction.
44
Third, much of the law concerning interstate transactions is federal
law;45 to the extent that this law is tried in state litigation, then, there
would be no gain by associating local counsel.
46
Knowledge of local rules of practice and procedure, however, is
a significant advantage obtained by associating local counsel. 47 Pro-
cedural variations are notorious among the states, and the unwaly
foreign attorney could easily fall victim to the local system without
assistance from the local bar. Attorneys not admitted to the state
bar would thus form the core of the "foreign" attorneys needing this
local advice, but some members of the state bar may also need pro-
cedural counseling. Hence the non-residency criterion used by many
states would appear to be much less satisfactory than a test based
on the extent of an applicant's active practice within the state.
A number of policy considerations have been advanced to justify
residency as the essential distinction between foreign and local at-
torneys for purposes of association. These are mostly matters of pro-
cedural convenience, since the non-resident attorney may be difficult
to procure at the call of the court's docket, hard to serve without
44. "[I]t would seem absurd that when the out-of-state trademark specialist goes to
a local branch [of a corporation], he should be required to obtain the assistance of a
resident general practitioner for whose views he would have little regard." Spanos v.
Skouras Theatres Corp., supra note 14, at 171.
45. For example, the states have jurisdiction to hear federal causes of action under
§ 22(a) of the Securities Act of 1933. 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1964).
46. See note 16 infra and accompanying text.
47. See Martin v. Davis, supra note 28, at 485, 357 P.2d at 790 (association rule
needed because of "failure of [Missouri oflficed Kansas attorneys] to familiarize
themselves with the rules of local practice and procedure by reason of their infrequent
appearance before the courts and tribunals"); 78 HARv. L. R1Ev. 1651 n.5 (1965).
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proceedings in another state, unresponsive to calls to appear on matters
of urgency, and as discussed earlier, unfamiliar with the local rules
of practice and procedure because of their infrequent appearances in
local courts.
48
Viewed solely from the interests of the local public, then, the needs
for control of attorneys, protection from ignorance of counsel, and
procedural convenience point toward an association statute of the fol-
lowing character: "Foreign" attorneys should include all attorneys not
admitted to the state bar plus those admitted who are not actively
engaged in local practice, or alternatively, plus those who are non-
residents. "Locar' associate attorneys should include all attorneys not
"foreign" attorneys, that is, lawyers admitted to the state bar who
are actively engaged in state practice, or who are residents.
Some state and federal limitations on the content of association
statutes should be mentioned. Depending upon the choice of au-
thoritative sources within each state, conflicting judicial and legis-
lative pronouncements on association requirements will be resolved
in favor of the source of ultimate power over admission pro hac vice.
49
Always limiting this state allocation of powers, however, are the
provisions of the state and federal constitutions. The reasonableness
of most association statutes under state and federal due process re-
quirements has either been satisfied or left unchallenged, 50 so that its
outer limits are not very clear. In the one instance where due process
was violated by an association statute, Arkansas found that a county-
residence requirement for local attorneys violated the state consti-
tution.51 Federal due process limitations were not mentioned by the
court; nor were they raised in an Iowa Supreme Court decision 2
sustaining a county-residence requirement for local associates. The
48. See Martin v. Davis, supra note 28, at 495, 357 P.2d at 790.
49. "An examination of the authorities will show that principally three views have
been taken in this country on that issue [of ultimate control of admission]: (1) that
the power to prescribe rules for admission and for the regulation of professional conduct
belongs to the legislative branch, with the duty of their enforcement lying within the
province of the judiciary; (2) that the entire subject is one pertaining inherently to
the judicial branch of the government; (3) that although the whole subject is a
judicial one yet that branch of the government will respect reasonable regulations
provided by the legislature so long as they are not restrictive." Harris, The Louisiana
Supreme Court and Bar Admissions, 8 Tur. L. REv. 417, 418 (1934). See also note 11
supra.
50. See, e.g., Martin v. Walton, supra note 4 (Kansas association rule upheld);
Arthaud v. Griffin, supra note 38 (Iowa statute upheld); Miss. CoDe ANN. § 8666
(1956) (unchallenged); NaB. RFV. STAT. ANN. § 7-103 (1962) (unchallenged); NEv.
Sup. CT. R. 11 (Nevada rule apparently unchallenged).
51. Letaw v. Smith, supra note 38. The rule was unreasonable in that associated
attorneys could be controlled by the court as easily if they resided outside the county,
but within the state. An alternative holding was that the court rule conflicted with an
existing state statute. Letaw v. Smith, supra note 38, at 642-43, 268 S.W. at 5.
52. Arthaud v. Griffin, supra note 38.
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equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment probably pro-
vides no limitation on association statutes, since the Supreme Court
has ruled that discrimination in an association statute applying to non-
resident lawyers produces only incidental individual inequality not
violative of the fourteenth amendment.5 3 A further test under the
equal protection clause is that the requirements imposed on foreign
attorneys and their local associates have a rational connection with
those persons' fitness and capacity to practice law.
54
(c) Conclusions Regarding State Pro Rae Vice Admission.-The
controversy over the format and validity of association court rules
and statutes has unfortunately led to a loss of perspective in the courts
and state legislatures. Association statutes have been interpreted
solely in light of protective local policies, being treated themselves
as a basis for admission. In reality, though, association statutes are
only limitations on the true basis for admission-the pro hac vice ex-
ception to the general prohibition against practice without admission
to the state bar. The policy which lies beneath admission of foreign
attorneys-the federal system policy of comity55-has been largely
overlooked. The courts only rarely consider the public interest in
having residents able to be represented by cousel of their own choice,
whether local or foreign. Few courts or legislatures consider the de-
sirability of a system of reciprocity in which attorneys could move
freely from state to state; yet in a sense every local attorney is also
a foreign attorney.56 Perhaps the courts should begin with a pre-
sumption of admissibility of foreign attorneys, and construe strictly
any association requirements.
This is not to disparage the local interest policies presently guiding
the formulation and interpretation of association statutes. At present,
these policies still have validity, although their significance will prob-
ably diminish in the near future.5 7 All that is suggested here is that
53. Martin v. Walton, supra note 4, at 26. The phrase "incidental individual
equality" is taken from Phelps v. Board of Educ., 300 U.S. 319 (1937), in which the
Court sustained the subclassification of teachers for various percentage reductions in
salaries. Id. at 324.
54. See Martin v. Walton, 368 U.S. 25 (1961) (dissenting opinion). "When Kansas
denies [this foreign attorney] the right to pursue his livelihood, it destroys his com-
petence for reasons that have no relation to competency." Id. at 28. The test is
generally applied to bar, rather than pro hay vice, admission requirements. See
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,
353 U.S. 232 (1957).
55. For an express recognition of comity within a pro hac vice rule, see GA. Sup.
CT. R. 2(a).
56. This is true, for example, whenever an attorney transacts business outside his
own county at least to the extent that he is unfamiliar with practices and customs in
the new environment. In addition, many local attorneys will at some time handle
matters with foreign elements.
57. Local restrictions based on procedural complexities are losing force as the
states increasingly adopt the philosophy and text of the Federal Rules of Civil
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the courts avoid mechanical applications of association statutes, and
move toward fuller consideration of the policies behind these statutes.
By viewing pro hac vice as an underlying judicial prerogative, to be
construed in light of association limitations, courts will have room to
disregard the limitations where circumstances require. And as the
social and economic forces in our count y become further interrelated,
the relative strengths of local and federal system policies can be
properly reassessed, and a more reasonable administration of the pro
hac vice power will result.
One further problem concerning pro hac vice admission deserves
attention, although its full treatment is beyond the scope of this note.
The power to admit pro hac vice ultimately resides in the discretion
of the courts; as such, the vitality of this form of admission depends
upon fair administration by the judiciary. Unfortunately, the recent
increase in civil rights litigation at the state level58 has brought to
light instances of arbitrary denials of pro hac vice admission to at-
torneys representing unpopular defendants.59 The discretionary nature
of this type of admission makes such rulings virtually non-appealable,
and frustrates statutory curatives. But this is not a defect in pro hac
vice procedures; it is a defect inherent in the society which appoints
to high places persons of questionable integrity.
2. Admission Without Permission of the Court.-Under certain
circumstances, foreign attorneys may appear by right in local- state
litigation, without regard to pro hac vice requirements. This right,
however, is never granted to the foreign attorney directly. It has
long been held that the privilege to practice law in state courts is
not a right granted by the federal constitution.60 The foreign attorney's
right to appear follows either from a broad right given laymen as well
as attorneys, or from a particular right of his client.
Procedure. Substantive knowledge of local law will be less basis for limiting practice
by foreign attorneys as the range of federal law increases and as the states enact
parallel statutes such as the Uniform Commercial Code. Further reason for the
decrease in validity of local policies comes from the extension of service of process
to the limits of the due process clause, through various forms of long-arm statutes.
Increased recognition of foreign causes of action will also diminish the need for
protective admissions rules.
58. See Brief of Lawyers Constitutional Defense Committee of ACLU as Amicus
Curiae at 3, Rowe v. Mississippi, - F. Supp. - (N.D. Miss. 1967). The increase
in state court handling of civil cases will continue as a result of the Supreme Court
decision in City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966), which confirmed strict
limits upon the right to remove civil rights cases to federal courts.
59. See Brief Amicus Curiae, supra note 58, at 4, 8-10, app. 5-8 (discussing recent
unpopular-defendant cases).
60. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139 (1872); Starr v. State Bd.
of Law Examiners, 159 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1947). Both of these are bar admission
cases.
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Among the rights of the first type is the right of foreign attorneys
to appear pro se-in state litigation; that is, they may represent them-
selves by the same rule that permits laymen to represent themselves.61
Residents of the local jurisdiction probably derive this right at com-
mon law from the right to enforce obligations given under the
local law. Most of the states have now made this right of residents
to appear pro se explicit by statute. 62 Non-residents are guaranteed
under the privileges and immunities clause the right to use the local
courts to assert their right to the same extent as local residents.63
A second right to appear granted to laymen as well as attorneys is
the right to represent others in courts of limited jurisdiction.64 This
right now has been virtually eliminated from the statutes, but its
policy is important. The lack of danger from malpractice was thought
to be so slight in such tribunals that formal representation was un-
necessary.6
5
The theories for appearances of foreign attorneys through the rights
of clients are still in the formative stages. The major sources for such
rights lie in federal law. Among these sources are the supremacy
clause, the full faith and credit clause, and the sixth and fourteenth
amendments of the federal constitution. The premise must be estab-
lished first, however, that the client has an absolute right to proceed
in the particular jurisdiction. And this premise has not been entirely
accepted by the state courts.6
61. See Arthaud v. Griffin, supra note 38, at 464, 210 N.W. at 541, and cases cited
therein (association statute not applicable "for the very obvious reason that the
appellant appears as plaintiff in propria persona").
62. See, e.g., KN. STAT. ANN. § 7-104 (1964); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 311:1
(1966).
63. See McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 292 U.S. 230 (1934); Richter v. East St.
Louis & S. Ry., 20 F.2d 220 (E.D. Mo. 1927). The privileges and immunities clause
is not applicable to corporations. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177-82
(1868)-.
64. See People v. Alfani, 227 N.Y. 334, 125 N.E. 671 (1919). "All rules must
have their limitations, according to circumstances, and as the evils disappear or lessen.
Thus a man may plead his own case in court, or draft his own will or legal papers.
Probably he may ask a friend or neighbor to assist him. We recognize that by [N.Y.
P:. LAw] section 270 and also 271 a person, not a lawyer, may appear for another
in a court not a record outside cities of the first and second class." Id. at 341, 125
N.E. at 674. The sections of the N.Y. PEN. LAw discussed here have subsequently
been repealed.
65. "The cases are generally of minor importance to the parties; such occasions are
seldom frequent enough to make it a business, and the procedure is so informal as to
constitute the judge really an arbiter in the dispute." People v. Alfani, supra note
64, at 341, 125 N.E. at 674. Some small claims courts might well adopt this policy.
66. Establishing this premise is a problem of substantive and judicial jurisdiction
common to every litigant, and one beyond the scope of this note. For the foreign
attorney, however, the problem is particularly acute. He must somehow have the
jurisdictional issue resolved for purposes of his admission, so that he may represent
his client on the argument of the jurisdictional issue for purposes of the lawsuit.
Resolution of the first issue would probably not be binding as to the second.
1290 [ VOL. 20
In situations where the state jurisdiction interwines with federal
jurisdiction, the supremacy clause may be a source for the right of
the foreign attorney to appear. For instance, the California Supreme
Court67 has recognized that a foreign attorney may appear as of right
in a state court to file papers removing a cause of action to the federal
courts. California had not tried to regulate such removal, but even
if it had, the court said, it would have been acting beyond its
authority.68 The supremacy clause, by implication, was the basis for
the decision.
Another possible source for a foreign attorney's right to appear in
state litigation is the full faith and credit clause. One use of this
source would challenge state power to refuse recognition to the public
act 69 of a foreign state in admitting attorneys to practice law. How-
ever, the success of this argument would depend upon an analogy to
the meager case law7" recognizing foreign disbarment proceedings
as binding in other states.
A second use of full faith and credit might be more fruitful. By
this reasoning, where full faith and credit provides a client with an
absolute right to proceed in state litigation, and that right would be
denied if he were not represented by foreign counsel, a right of
admission passes to the foreign counsel selected. Denial of admission
of the foreign attorney would thus be considered an effective denial
of full faith and credit.
Parallel logic would suggest that substantive due process would
be denied a client where necessary representation by foreign counsel
is refused, in that the client is thus effectively prevented from en-
forcing his rights. A third source made significant by similar reasoning
67. In re McCue, 211 Cal. 57, 67-68, 293 P. 47, 52 (1930).
68. Id. at 68, 293 P. at 51. See also Cowen v. Calabrese, 230 Cal. App. 2d 870,
872-73, 41 Cal. Rptr. 441, 443 (1964) (supremacy clause impliedly used to make state
law inapplicable to federal bankruptcy proceeding).
69. The Second Circuit recently found that where a right has been conferred by
federal law, there is a "right to bring to the assistance of an attorney admitted in
the resident state a lawyer licensed by 'public act of any other state. . . ." Spanos
v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 364 F.2d 161, 170 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 987
(1966). The court's holding was based, however, on the privileges and immunities
clause. Id. at 170. The suggested application of full faith and credit can be questioned
on the ground that the act of licensing is a special public act not within the protection
of art. IV, § 1. Further, the privilege to practice a profession in one state has been
held to guarantee no similar privilege in another state. See Rhode Island v. Rosenkrans,
30 R.I. 374, 75 A. 491 (1910), aff'd, 225 U.S. 698 (1912) (dentistry). See generally
Ross, "Full Faith and Credit" in a Federal System, 20 MINN. L. REv. 140 (1935).
70. In re Van Bever, 55 Ariz. 368, 101 P.2d 790 (1940); In re Leverson, 195 Minn.
42, 261 N.W. 480 (1935); Copren v. State Bar, 64 Nev. 364, 183 P.2d 833 (1947);
In re Brown, 60 S.D. 628, 245 N.W. 824 (1932); State Bd. of Law Examiners v.
Brown, 53 Wyo. 42, 77 P.2d 626 (1938). Contra, In re Isserman, 345 U.S. 286
(1953), set aside, 348 U.S. 1 (1954); Florida Bar v. Wilkes, 179 So. 2d 193 (Fla.
1965); In re Porep, 60 Nev. 393, 111 P.2d 533 (1941).
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might be the right to effective representation by counsel,7 1 guaranteed
by the sixth and fourteenth amendments.
One difficulty with these approaches, however, may severely restrict
their application, for each is premised on an ability to prove the
inadequacy of local counsel. In civil rights or other unpopular-de-
fendant cases, local antipathy might be so extreme as to make repre-
sentation by foreign counsel a necessity. In highly specialized areas
of the law, where only foreign counsel were truly qualified to provide
effective representation, one of these theories might also be helpful.
A further alternative to the client seeking representation by
foreign counsel is to insist that the right to counsel guarantees a
right to counsel of one's own choosing.72 This is much broader than
the right to effective counsel, and if given effect, would do much
toward eliminating state barriers to the interstate practice of law. In
the 1950 case of Cooper v. Hutchison," the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit considered the argument. Counsel based
their plea on United States v. Bergamo,74 in which the same court had
found a sixth amendment right to counsel of one's own choice in
federal criminal prosecutions.75 They urged76 that, since their client
had been tried for a capital crime in a state court, the Supreme Court's
ruling in Powell v. Alabama"7 should grant him the same right to
71. The right to effective counsel should be distinguished from the right to assistance
of counsel at public expense. Compare Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932)
(designation of counsel was "either so indefinite or so close upon trial as to amount
to a denial of effective and substantial aid in that regard"), with Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right of indigent defendant in criminal trial to assistance of
counsel). The latter right accrues only in felony prosecutions, but the former may now
be a part of one's right to employ counsel. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964). In that case, the Supreme
Court seemed to forbid any state interference with an individual's right to employ
effective counsel. "Laymen cannot be expected to know how to protect their rights
when dealing with practiced and carefully counseled adversaries . . . and for them
to associate together to help one another preserve and enforce rights granted to them
under federal laws cannot be condemned as a threat to legal ethics. The State can no
more keep these workers from using their cooperative plan to advise one another than
it could use more direct means to bar them from resorting to the courts to vindicate
their legal rights. The right to petition the courts cannot be so handicapped." Id.
at 7.
72. For an early use of the phraseology, see Powell v. Alabama, supra note 71, at
53 ("It is hardly necessary to say that . . . a defendant should be afforded a fair
opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice.").
73. 184 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1950).
74. 154 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1946).
75. "To hold that defendants in a criminal trial may not be defended by out-of-
the-district counsel selected by them is to vitiate the guarantees of the Sixth Amend-
ment. Under the circumstances of the case at bar the defendants were deprived
of the advice of counsel of their own choosing." Id. at 35.
76. Cooper v. Hutchison, supra note 73, at 121-22.
77. Supra note 71.
choose foreign counsel in a state prosecution as Bergamo granted in
a federal trial. The Third Circuit did in fact permit the foreign attor-
ney to practice as of right; but it do so on other grounds 8 stating
further that Bergamo was "not conclusive" since it billy established
qualifications for trials in the Third Circuit.7
9 "
With the 1963 extension, in Gideon v. Wainwright,0 of the right
to counsel in all state felony prosecutions, application of the Bergamo
interpretation would permit foreign attorneys to practice as of right
in any state or federal criminal prosecution. Indeed, this might not
be an undesirable circumstance. In at least one case8' since Gideon,
the issue has presented itself. There, a foreign attorney selected by
the defendant was permitted to represent him in a capital prosecution
without association of local counsel as required by rule of court. How-
ever, the challenge was raised not by the state, but by the defendant
himself subsequent to his conviction. The court avoided the issue
by ruling that the defendant had "waived the right, if any he had,"
8 2
to local counsel.
These alternative theories under federal law to enable a foreign
attorney to appear as of right in state litigation are especially sig-
nificant in light of two recent Supreme Court decisions-NAACP v.
Button83 and Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia.8 These
two cases upset the balance of policies formerly in favor of state
control of the bar, and emphasize instead the constitutional rights of
individuals.
A State could not, by invoking the power to regulate the professional
conduct of attorneys, infringe in any way the right of individuals and the
public to be fairly represented in lawsuits authorized by Congress to ef-
fectuate a basic public interest.85
In each case, the Court looked first to the constitutional right pro-
78. The court found that defendant's attorneys bad been admitted pro hac vice
on the first trial, and that their admission to practice could not arbitrarily be revoked
on remand. Cooper v. Hutchison, supra note 73, at 122-23.
79, Cooper v. Hutchison, supra note 73, at 122. Cf. E.D. MicHr. R. 1(2) (giving
attorneys admitted to highest court of state of residence, United States Supreme Court,
or any United States court of appeals or district court a right to appear in any criminal
proceedings).
80. Supra note 71.
81. Blakesley v. Crouse, 332 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1964) (habeas corpus proceeding
against Kansas warden based on failure of defendant's Missouri attorney, in Kansas
trial, to associate Kansas counsel).
82. Id. at 850.
83. 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (Virginia unable to show substantial regulatory interest in
denying NAACP right to provide counsel for Negroes involved in civil rights litigation).
84. Supra note 71 (Virginia unable to show substantial regulatory interest in deny-
ing railroad union's right to solicit attorneys to protect its members' federal rights).
85. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, supra note
71, at 7.
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tected, 6 and then shifted the burden of proof to the state "to
advance any substantial regulatory interest, in the form of substantive
evils flowing from petitioner's activities, which can justify the broad
prohibitions which it has imposed."87 It is submitted that the evils
flowing from representation by foreign attorneys without permission of
the court would not be sufficient, at least in state criminal prosecu-
tions, to carry the burden.
B. Admission to Federal Litigation Practice
The foreign attorney seeking admission to a federal court is con-
fronted with three means of admission, none of which satisfies the
needs of an interstate legal practice. Admission to practice generally
before a particular federal court, although sometimes less stringent
than its state practice variant,88 usually requires admission to the
bar of the state in which the court sits, and often residency or main-
tenance of an office within the judicial district 9 This is not a practical
alternative. In most federal jurisdictions, attorneys with only occa-
sional practice before a particular federal court find admission pro
hac vice a more realistic, although not entirely satisfactory, alterna-
tive. Association requirements and disqualification provisions often
86. In Button, the state regulation was found to have infringed on first and fourteenth
amendments rights to enforce constitutional rights through litigation. 371 U.S. at 437,
441. It has been suggested that the decision could have been based on the ground
that the NAACP "was engaged only in protecting political rights or on the correlative
nature of Virginia's action stated in Mr. Justice Douglas' concurring opinion [371
U.S. at 445-46] as a thinly veiled part of Virginia's 'massive resistance' to the law of
the land." See Cheatham, The Supreme Court and the Profession of Law, 14 CATHiOLC,
U.L. REV. 192, 194 (1965). In Brotherhood, the state regulation infringed on the
first and fourteenth amendment guarantees of free speech, petition and assembly. 377
U.S. at 5.
87. NAACP v. Button, supra note 83, at 444, quoted in Brotherhood of R.R. Train-
men, supra note 71, at 8. The burden of "substantial regulatory interest" has yet to
be clearly defined. See Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. UMW, District 12, 35 Ill. 2d 112, 219
N.E.2d 503 (1966), cert. granted, 386 U.S. 941 (1967) (state prohibited union from
employing salaried attorney to prosecute workmen's compensation claims of members).
88. Compare S.D.N.Y. R. 3, with N.Y. CT. App. R. VII-1. Foreign attorneys from
New Jersey, Connecticut and Vermont, who are admitted to a local district court which
has reciprocity with S.D.N.Y., are admitted to the bar of S.D.N.Y. on the same basis
as New York lawyers of at least one year's membership in the New York bar. But
foreign attorneys from those same states would have to reside in New York State for
six months and have five years of foreign practice before they could be admitted to
the New York State bar.
89. The requirements for bar admission of ten district courts have been selected as
representative of the general pattern in this country. At least one court from each
circuit except the Fourth and District of Columbia Circuits has been used. The ten
district courts are those for the S.D. Cal.; D. Colo.; S.D. Fla.; N.D. Ill.; D. Mass.;
E.D. Mich.; E.D. Mo.; D.N.J.; S.D.N.Y.; and the E.D. Pa. At least one major city is
located within each district, so as to weight the sample towards the districts handling
more interstate legal problems. Seven of the ten district courts require membership in
the bar of the state in which they are sitting. See S.D. CAL. R. 1(c) (1); D. CoLO. R.
4(b); S.D. FLA. R. 14; D. MAss. R. 2; E.D. MIcH. R. 1(1) (automatic district court
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limit its applicability.90 Where neither form of admission by applica-
tion to the court is available, foreign attorneys may avail themselves
of a third means of participation-admission through the rights of
membership for all members of Michigan bar); E.D. Mo. R. II(1); D.N.J. R. 4(B)..
The other three districts permit applicants for bar admission to be members of either
the state bar or some other bar. See N.D. ILL. R. 6(a) (members of bars of the
"Supreme Court" [probably referring to Ill. Sup. Ct.], Wisconsin or Indiana); S.D.N.Y.
R. 3(a) (members of New York bar and members of state and district court bars in
Vermont, Connecticut and New Jersey whose district courts extend a corresponding
privilege to attorneys of S.D.N.Y.); E.D. PA. R. 5(a) (members of Pa. or U.S. Sup.
Ct. bar). Two district courts permit bar admission without formal proceedings for
attorneys from neighboring districts. See S.D. FLA. R. 14 (for attorneys from M.D.
Fla. and N.D. Fla.); S.D.N.Y. R. 3(b) (for attorneys from E.D.N.Y.). Only two of
the ten courts require some length of state bar membership. See D. MAss. R. 2 (one
year); S.D.N.Y. R. 3(a) (one year for N.Y. bar members; no similar requirement for
members of Vt., Conn., or N.J. bars). A majority of six of the district courts make no
stipulation as to the residency of the applicant. See S.D. Fla.; N.D. Ill.; E.D. Mich.;
S.D.N.Y.; D.N.J.; E.D. Pa. Two courts restrict admission to certain residents. See D.
MAss. R. 2 (residents of state-district); E.D. Mo. R. II(1) (Mo. residents must reside
within district; non-Mo. residents must reside within county adjacent to district for
membership, but must associate a resident member for appearances). And two courts
require either residency or maintenance of an office within the district. See S.D. CAL.
R. 1(c)(1); D. COLO. R. 4(b). Three of the ten districts do not require a local
office for applicants. See N.D. Ill.; D. Mass.; E.D. Mich. Three others require no
local office for admission, but condition appearances upon presence before the court
of a member with a local office. See S.D. FLA. R. 15 (office within state); D.N.J.
R. 5 (office within state-district); S.D.N.Y. R. 4(a) (office within either S.D.N.Y. or
E.D.N.Y.). One district court has no office requirement for members residing in the
district, but does require the non-resident applicant himself to have an office within
the judicial district. See E.D. Mo. R. II(1). The remaining three districts have some
form of office requirement for admission of all applicants. In two, applicants must
either have an office within the district or reside therein. See S.D. CAL. R. 1(c)(1);
D. COLO. R. 4(b). In one, all applicants must maintain an office within the state.
See E.D. PA. R. 5(a). One of the ten district courts has special rules for admission
of patent attorneys. See D.N.J. R. 4(E) (limited to U.S. patent attorneys, domiciled in
N. J., who are admitted to a state or federal bar).
90. The same ten district courts considered in note 89 supra will be used to indi-
cate the nature of federal pro hac vice admission requirements. Only one of the courts
limits admission pro hac vice to members of a federal court. See S.D. FLA. R. 14 (any
U.S. district court). The remaining nine courts extend this privilege to state, and
sometimes territorial and foreign country attorneys, as well as those admitted to federal
bars. See S.D. CAL. R. 1(d) (any U.S. court or highest court of any state, territory
or insular possession); D. CoLo. R. 4(d) (court of record of any state or territory);
N.D. ILL. R. 6(b) (any U.S. district court or highest state court); D. MAss. R. 2
("any court"); E.D. MicH. R. 1(2) (any U.S. court or highest court of state of
residence); E.D. Mo. R. 11(h) (any U.S. or highest state court); D.N.J. R. 4(c) (any
U.S. or highest state court); S.D.N.Y. R. 3(c) (any U.S. district court or state court);
E.D. PA. R. 6(a) ("any attorney" not a member of the bar of E.D. Pa.). Seven of
the ten district courts have an association rule, four of which require the associate
attorney to have a local office. See S.D. CAL. R. 1(d) (in district); S.D. FLA. R. 14
(in district); S.D.N.Y. R. 4(a) (in district or in E.D.N.Y.); E.D. PA. R. 6(a) (in
state). The Colorado district court requires the local associate either to have an office
in the state or to reside there. See D. CoLo. R. 4(d). The other two districts with
association rules demand that the associate attorney reside within the district. See E.D.
Mo. R. II(h); D.N.J. R. 5. The three district courts without association rules are the
N.D. Ill., D. Mass., and the E.D. Mich. Four district courts disqualify certain attorneys
from application for pro hac vice admission. In three of those, the disqualified attorneys
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their clients. However, the circumstances in which this right of
admission may arise are extremely limited.91
1. Authoritative Sources for Admission to Federal Courts.-Federal
tribunals are vested with their authority over admission of attorneys
by their inherent powers to control the practice of law before them.
92
Since there is no general federal bar to which an attorney may be
admitted, each court at each level of the federal judiciary establishes
its own standards for admission.93 The content of these rules is
limited, of course, by federal constitutional provisions; but state
standards of practice are not conclusive on their meaning.
94
Federal law is the source for admission as of right for foreign attor-
are all those attorneys eligible for bar admission. See S.D. CAL. R. 1(d); D. COLO. R.
4(d); and D.N.J. R. 4(c). In the fourth court, only residents of the district are in-
eligible. See E.D. Mo. R. II(h) (thus, residents of non-Missouri counties adjacent to
the district can apply for both forms of admission). One district has explicitly rejected
the logic of these courts. See D. MAss. R. 2 (residents and non-residents may apply
for pro hac vice admission). Two of the courts have special pro hac vice rules. One
limits admission, individually and by law firm, to three actions in a calendar year.
See D.N.J. R. 4(c). The second district permits foreign attorneys to appear in any
criminal proceedings without application to the court for admission. See E.D. Micro R.
1(3) (non-Michigan attorneys who are admitted to highest court of state where they
reside, or any U.S. court).
91. See text accompanying notes 95-97 infra.
92. "The Supreme Court of the United States, as the ultimate body in which is
vested 'the judicial Power of the United States,' has inherent power over its own bar
and over the bar of the other federal courts and tribunals as well." Cheatham, The
Reach of Federal Action Over the Profession of Law, 18 STAN. L. REv. 1288, 1289
(1966). See also Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Jackson, 235 F.2d 390, 393 (10th Cir.
1956).
93. Congressional recognition of rule-making power in the Supreme Court and all
courts established by Congress is found in 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1964). For the text of
the rules of each court, see 28 U.S.C.A. RuLEs-Evis_ RuLIS OF TnE Supnri,=n
CouwT OF Tnm UN-T=D STATES (Supp. 1966); 28 U.S.C.A. RuLmEs-UNlvz STATES
COURTS OF APPEALs RuLEs (1964), as amended, (Supp. 1966); FEDEmAL LOCAL
COURT RULEs (Callaghan & Co. 1967).
D4. By virtue of the supremacy clause of the federal constitution, federal courts are
not bound by state rules. See Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 235 F. Supp. 1,
13-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd on rehearing, supra note 69; In re McCue, supra note
67, at 68, 293 P. at 51. The same rule applies to federal tribunals. See Sperry v.
Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 384 (1963) (state rules inapplicable only on exercise of fed-
eral power); De Pass v. B. Harris Wool Co., 346 Mo. 1038, 144 S.W.2d 146 (1940)
(state rules inapplicable to I.C.C. hearing). The federal courts, however, do in fact
give much weight to state policies regarding admission of foreign attorneys. See Spanos
v. Skouras Theatres Corp., supra note 69, at 171 (following state association rule);
Id. at 172 (dissenting opinion) (urging the honoring of New York's "strong public
policy" of denying fees in such instances); Application of Wasserman, 240 F.2d 213,
215 (9th Cir. 1956) ("[R]ecognition by the United States District Court of the re-
quirements of admission in the state courts and the policy behind this criminal statute
is not only proper but highly commendable"); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Jackson,
supra note 02, at 393 (advice of state bar association used by district court); Spanos
v. Skouras Theatres Corp., supra note 94, at 11-13 (following state's solitary incident
rule); Piorkowski v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 131 F. Supp. 553, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1955)
(borrowing of state characterization of word "office" for use in federal court rule).
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neys. In this prescribing function, federal law has been found to
permit representation by foreign counsel through the privileges and
immunities clause wherever a federal claim or defense is involved,
and where jurisdiction is based on a federal question 5 The due
process clause is probably the source of the attorney's right to appear
pro se. 6 And the sixth amendment right to counsel in federal criminal
proceedings apparently allows foreign attorneys to enter federal litiga-
tion as of right.9
2. Policies Relevant to Admission to Federal Courts.-The basic
policies underlying federal rules of court again rest in the protection
of the public from unethical and incompetent practice of law; and
control of the bar through admission requirements is again the means
used to effectuate these policies. Competency, however, is not assured
entirely by federal procedures. Since passage of a general'examination
on federal law is not required for bar admission, the individual federal
courts have had to rely upon state examinations98 to designate the
attorneys who may be admitted to practice generally. Federal court
protections against incompetency among bar members may include
some form of inquiry into an applicant's moral character,99 and occa-
sionally into his intellectual qualifications. 0 Except where this latter
95. See Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., supra note 69, at 170. "For we hold
that under the privileges and immunities clause of the Constitution no state can pro-
hibit a citizen with a federal claim or defense from engaging an out-of-state lawyer to
collaborate with an in-state lawyer and give legal advice concerning it within the
state." Id. The Second Circuit's conclusion is praiseworthy, but its reasoning is ques-
tionable. By employing the privileges and immunities clause, the court would appear
to have given greater rights to natural persons who are clients than to corporate clients,
since that clause of the constitution does not apply to corporations. See Paul v. Virginia,
supra note 63, at 177-82. In Spanos, the court apparently considered the client to be
the corporation's president; but such logic could always extend the protection of the
privileges and immunities clause to corporations. This extension has never been at-
tempted in the past.
96. See Hightower v. Hawthorn, 12 F. Cas. 142 (No. 6478b) (Ark. Super. Ct.
1826) (citing statutory and common law rights to appear pro se). The district courts
often have special rules for pro se appearances. See, e.g., S.D.N.Y. R. 4(b); E.D. PA.
R. 11(b).
97. See Cooper v. Hutchison, supra note 73, at 121-23; United States v. Bergamo,
supra note 74, at 35; E.D. MicH. R. 1(3). See also text accompanying notes 72-82
supra.
98. See note 94 supra for use of state bar admission by federal district courts. See
also Crotty, Requirements for Admission to Practice in Federal Courts, SuRVEY OF TE
LEGAL PnoFEssiON, BAn EXAMINATIONs AND REQumEMENTS FOR ADMISION TO THE BAR
144 (1952) (advocating that all district courts require only admission to bar of
highest court of state in which they are sitting).
99. See e.g., S.D. CAL. R. 1(c) ("good moral character"); N.D. ILL. R. 6(a)(i),
(ii) (requiring verified petition stating that applicant has read the Canons of Ethics
and "will faithfully adhere thereto," and affidavits of others concerning the applicant's
character). See also Crotty, supra note 98, at 132-33.
100. See, e.g., E.D. Mo. R. II(a), (b). See also Crotty, supra note 98, at 131-32
(listing districts with examinations in 1952). Cf. S.D.N.Y. B. 3(a), requiring applicant
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inquiry consists of testing knowledge of federal substantive and proce-
dural rules, the only assurance of competence given to the public
is that admitted attorneys are familiar with state law and procedure.
It would seem that foreign state attorneys are no less qualified to
practice in federal courts than are local state attorneys. 1 1 Distinctions
between these two types of attorneys, then, can hardly be based on
protection of the public from incompetent practice of law. Perhaps
admission to the bar of all federal courts through a federal law
examination'02 would be a more effective and less cumbersome means
of assuring the public of qualified attorneys practicing in federal
courts.
Reliance upon state admission standards can be explained in part
on the diversity jurisdiction feature10 3 of the federal courts. Because
much of the content of federal practice is state law, the states have a
significant interest in having only qualified attorneys practice in
federal courts. Since state citizens may have their state-created rights
decided as conclusively in federal court as in state court, total dis-
regard of state policies hardly seems justifiable solely on the citizenship
of litigants and the amount in controversy.
The selection of the appropriate state policies to be considered,
however, is a difficult matter. Present federal court rules generally
reflect a policy of vertical uniformity within the jurisdictions, paying
much respect to the policies of the states or territories in which the
courts sit. Thus, admission to the local state bar is often required.'"
Policies of other states, however, may be more significant, as where all
the contacts except the citizenship of one of the parties are with
states other than the local state, and the law is that of another state.
This problem could be resolved by a choice of law rule, weighing
each of the various interests and selecting the state most significantly
to submit a verified petition certifying that he has read and is familiar with, inter alla,
the provisions of the Judicial Code (28 U.S.C.) which pertain to jurisdiction of the
district courts, the federal rules of civil and criminal procedure, and the rules of the
local district court.
101. This would be true except for those issues which involve only the law of the
forum state. Otherwise, "I doubt whether many states make much, if any inquiry,
as to what, if anything, applicants to their bar may know about federal law. Thus
out-of-state lawyers advising in whole or in part on federal law would seem well
advised not to apply for state admission or for federal court admission and thus
avoid all possibility of supervision or check." Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp.,
supra note 69, at 172 (dissenting opinion). Apparently at least Delaware includes
questions concerning federal practice on its state bar examination. See Crotty, supra
note 98, at 131.
102. The suggestion of a single federal bar for the federal courts originated with
Professor Elliott E. Cheatham of the Vanderbilt University School of Law. Opposition
to federal examinations, at least if varied for each court bar, has been based on the
increased supervisory load on federal judges. See Crotty, supra note 98, at 145,
103. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964).
- 104. See note 89 supra.
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related to a particular case; however, such a rule would probably
be too cumbersome for federal admission procedures. The issue would
perhaps better be avoided than resolved, as by looking to the policy
of horizontal uniformity, that is, among all of the federal courts, to
permit disregard of all state policies despite diversity jurisdiction. The
true determinant, though, is which type of rule would best serve the
public interest.
As has been illustrated, the public interest in competent legal
services within the federal courts is served equally poorly by requir-
ing admission to the bar of the local state as by permitting members
of foreign state bars to practice.10 5 The public interest in the ethical
practice of law is met when control over the attorneys is satisfactory.
In federal litigation, much control over both foreign and local attor-
neys results from the direct supervision of the federal judge. The
contempt power available to the court may be sufficient to prevent
injustices to the clients. Criminal acts committed by attorneys in
federal litigation would certainly not go uncontrolled, regardless of
whether the attorney was from a foreign state or the local state.
The only difficulties that might arise would be in civil suits, where
jurisdiction over the wrongdoer might be difficult to obtain.
Thus, the local interest policies favoring restrictions on bar admis-
sion of foreign attorneys have little or no real validity.0 6 The tradi-
tional local state definition of public interest is satisfied by the ordi-
nary safeguards in federal litigation, and cannot justify greater
restrictions on foreign attorneys than on local attorneys. Furthermore,
the federal policies enumerated in Part III-right to counsel of one's
own choosing, right to privileges and immunities of citizens of other
states; full faith and credit protection of public acts, judgments and
causes of action; supremacy of federal law over state law; and safe-
guards of due process and equal protection under the law-all these
combine to emphasize the need for clients to have the same availabil-
ity of counsel in each of the federal courts. Federal system policies
also point towards equality among foreign and local attorneys prac-
ticing in the federal courts. Legal advice may be needed without the
105. If the premise is correct that much state law is practiced in the federal courts,
and that most of that state law is that of the forum state, then elimination of local
state bar admission from federal admission rules must be even more contrary to the
public interest in competent practice. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); and N.D. ILL.
R. 6(a), S.D.N.Y. R. 3(a), and E.D. PA. R. 5(a) discussed in note 90, supra. However,
the absence of any examination requirement in most states for foreign attorneys apply-
ing for bar admission indicates that knowledge of the minutiae of state law is not
always a prerequisite of state bar admission. See, e.g., N.Y. CT. APP. R. VII ("Admis-
sion Without Examination").
106. One local policy does have validity, although it should restrict only appearances,
not bar admission. This is the policy of procedural convenience, discussed in notes
110, 111 & 113 infra.
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delay and expense incident to admission to federal court,107 which is
required for the foreign attorney meeting the litigation needs of his
interstate client. For the federal system to function smoothly, without
unduly restricting interstate legal services, ease of practice within all
of the federal courts must be obtained.
3. Conclusions on Admission to Federal Courts.-The present stan-
dards for admission of foreign attorneys to federal litigation practice
are unrelated to the basic policies underlying admission. Admission
to the bar of each federal court is usually restricted to local state
attorneys, although admission of foreign state attorneys would create
no greater public danger of unethical or incompetent legal services.
Federal bar admission suffers from the particularization of local rules
for each federal court,10 8 and from the lack of broad admission re-
quirements to ensure the competency of practitioners in federal
litigation.
Rather than meet these inconsistencies with a single admission
policy and set of rules, the federal courts have adopted pro hac vice
rules of court to permit some degree of entry to foreign attorneys. This
circumstance, while appearing to ease the inequality between local
and foreign attorneys in bar admission requirements, has three defects
which make it inadequate. First, some local pro hac vice rules are se-
verely restricted by various prerequisites to the court's exercise of its
discretion to admit. Designation of local associate counsel is often such
a prerequisite, 109 based more on a need for procedural convenience"
than on benefit to the parties."' Second, even without such additional
requirements, the time and expense of securing the permission of the
court to appear pro hac vice may be unduly prejudicial to the client
with foreign counsel." 2 Third, even were pro hac vice admission as
available as bar admission, the public would not receive its needed
107. See Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., supra note 69, at 170 (challenging
dissenting opinion's suggestions that broadened admission requirements would satisfy
needs of interstate practitioner).
108. The variation in federal admission rules should be apparent from notes 89 & 90
supra. Uniformity of rules is certainly a desirable end. See Crotty, supra note 98, at
145 (urging uniformity through elimination of local court examinations, and through
use of single pro hac vice rule).
109. See local court rules cited note 90 supra.
110. See S.D. CAL.. R. 1(d) (an associate "with whom the Court and opposing
counsel may readily communicate regarding the conduct of the case and upon whom
papers shall be served"). See also text accompanying note 48 supra.
111. The countervailing interest with respect to association rules are considered in
Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., supra note 69, at 171. Other restrictions on pro
hac vice include the disqualification provisions for attorneys eligible for bar admission,
and exclusion of attorneys not admitted to one of the designated bars. See note 90
supra. The last restriction may preclude any admission of foreign attorneys, who
usually cannot qualify for state bar admission. See note 4 supra.
112. See Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., supra note 69, at 170.
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protection from incompetent legal advice, for admission to a state bar
is no assurance that the attorney is capable of handling federal litiga-
tion.
It is submitted that a federal bar having admission standards suf-
ficient to select intellectually and morally qualified attorneys would
more completely satisfy the public interest. Control over attorneys
admitted to the federal bar could be facilitated by a rule that all
attorneys appearing in federal court are subject to service of process
throughout the nation for any cause of action or dereliction arising
from participation in preparation or trial of a case in the court. Con-
tempt power would be available as would liability for criminal
wrongs. And local court rules could require designation of a location
for service of papers within the district.113 With such an admissions
structure, admission pro hac vice would probably be used only
sparingly, as for admission of attorneys from foreign countries.
114
The admission standards for such a federal bar should be inde-
pendent of state limitations, with one exception; admission to some
state bar ought to be retained as a prerequisite to ensure some familiar-
ity with non-federal substantive law which might arise in federal
litigation. However, as has been already recognized by the courts,"15
disbarment from a state bar should not be conclusive on the federal
courts.
V. ADMISION TO OFFICE PRACTICE
Office practice of law-practice not pursuant to local litigation 116-
generally may not legally be undertaken by persons not admitted to
113. Most local court rules now require such a designation, although association of
resident counsel or counsel with an office in the district may be viewed as enhancing
the control of the court. See note 90 supra for listing of federal district court associ-
ation rules. With control satisfied by other means, local associates would serve only
the interests of procedural convenience. As such, any layman legally able to accept
service and either living or working within the district should qualify as a local
associate.
114. Pro hac vice might also be used regularly for attorneys who have not had an
opportunity to be admitted to the federal bar, such as those recently admitted to their
state bar. But there is no justification for disqualifying from use of pro hac vice those
attorneys who have never taken advantage of their opportunity to gain federal bar
admission.
115. See Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278 (1957); Selling v. Radford, 243
U.S. 46 (1917). But see D. CoLO. R. 4(e) (automatic federal disbarment or suspen-
sion upon disbarment or suspension from practice in Colorado state courts).
116. Legal services performed with regard to prospective, pending, or past litigation
are generally classified as litigation practice. Although differentiation 'may be difficult
where a prospective lawsuit is not filed, office practice does include all other law
practice. Thus, only attorneys admitted to practice in a jurisdiction may prepare legal
instruments for others or give advice to clients on matters of law. See People v. Alfani,
227 N.Y. 334, 125 N.E. 671 (1919); In re Duncan, 83 S.C. 186, 65 S.E. 210 (1909);
ALA. CODE tit. 46, § 42(c) (1958) (any act in a representative capacity). Counseling
with regard to out-of-state litigation, however, may be considered local office practice.
See Spivak v. Sachs, 16 N.Y.2d 163, 211 N.E.2d 329, 263 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1965)
(advice in New York regarding Connecticut litigation).
1967 ] NOTES 1301
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
the local bar." 7 The reason for such a harsh rule is said to lie in the
grave public danger resulting from the absence of any direct judicial
control or supervision over office practitioners," 8 and the resulting
difficulty in detecting office practice violations. Much of this danger is
attributable to the lay practitioner, who raises problems which are
beyond the scope of this note. However, our concern is with the
foreign attorney, and our inquiry is whether the public interest
mentioned above justifies the virtual exclusion of foreign attorneys
who are intellectually and morally qualified to conduct office practice.
Central to this exclusion is the failure of the states to distinguish
litigation practice from office practice. Bar admission, as we have
seen, is generally an impracticable alternative for foreign attorneys;
and admission to enough state bars adequately to serve the larger
interstate client is impossible. Unfortunately, the established excep-
tions for litigation practice are not available to the foreign office
practitioner. Admission pro hac vice is limited to litigation, and no
parallels exist to the litigant-client's right to choose a foreign attor-
ney."
9
This problem has grown in recent years and hampers the legal
services essential to much interstate and international commerce. The
increase of non-litigation practice, together with the multiplication
of interstate business and social connections, make out-of-court inter-
state legal services an everyday necessity. International transactions,
which require office practice services, are also becoming common-
place, so that the attorneys from foreign countries are increasingly
involved in office practice situations within American states. These
attorneys have a more critical need for relaxed office practice rules
than do American attorneys, because the alternative of bar admission
is foreclosed in most states by the requirement of American citizen-
ship. 10
117. New York first recognized office practice as forbidden to other than admitted
attorneys in 1919 by statutory construction. See People v. Alfani, supra note 116, at
337, 125 N.E. at 673. Connecticut did so by statute in 1933. See Taft v. Amsel, 23
Conn. Supp. 225, 228, 180 A.2d 756, 757 (Super. Ct. 1962). Research has revealed
no state that does not follow this rule.
118. "Is it only in court or in legal proceedings that danger lies from such evils?
On the contrary, the danger there is at a minimum for a very little can go wrong in a
court where the proceedings are public, and the presiding officer is generally a man of
judgment and experience. Any judge of much active work on the bench has bad
frequent occasion to guide the young practitioner, or protect the client from the
baste or folly of an older one. Not so in the office. Here the client is with his attorney
alone, without the impartial supervision of the judge. Ignorance and stupidity may here
create damage which the courts of the land cannot thereafter undo." People v. Alfani,
supra note 116, at 339-40, 125 N.E. at 673.
119. See note 143 infra.
120. See note 4 supra.
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A. Authoritative Sources for Office Practice Admission Rules
One major problem often bypassed by courts and legislatures in
formulating and interpreting admission rules for foreign attorneys is
defining the authoritative source for office practice rules. The body
having primary jurisdiction over litigation practice is, of course, the
court in which the litigation is being conducted. State and federal
litigation rules have thus enjoyed relatively independent growth.
Office practice, on the other hand, has, by definition, no court connec-
tions that would indicate whether federal or state law should govern.
Locus of performance is not especially helpful, since office practice
always takes place within a federal judicial district at the same time
it takes place within a state. Present law apparently presupposes
that federal rules apply only to federal court practice, leaving state
rules to govern state litigation and all office practice. It is ques-
tionable, however, whether this state jurisdiction over office practice
is truly exclusive; for federal jurisdiction would seem at least concur-
rent where solely federal law is practiced. 12 ' Resolution of this issue
has not been attempted directly by the courts or the legislatures. 22
B. Rules Governing Office Practice Admission
The usual state rule forbids all office practice by persons who are
not admitted to the bar of the state in which the practice takes place. 23
This rule holds true regardless of the content of the law to be prac-
ticed, whether local or foreign state law,124 federal law,'2 or the law
of another nation.
26
Two state law exceptions do permit some office practice by the
foreign attorney, but neither resolves the problem directly. The first,
often referred to as the solitary incident or incidental services rule,
127
121. Concurrent state and federal jurisdiction over the practice of federal law re-
garding patents was recognized in Sperry v. Florida, supra note 94, at 384, 403.
122. Whether office practice may in part be controlled by federal law is discussed
in note 9 supra, and text accompanying notes 146-56 infra.
123. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 46, §§ 31, 42(b)-(d) (1958); N.Y. PEzT. LAw § 270
(McKinney 1944, Supp. 1966). Many jurisdictions equally condemn office practice by
foreign attorneys and by laymen, as indicated in Spivak v. Sachs, supra. note 116, at
168, 211 N.E.2d at 311, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 956: "The statute aims to protect our citizens
against the dangers of legal representation and advice given by persons not trained,
examined and licensed for such work, whether they be laymen or lawyers from other
jurisdictions." See also Harriman v. Strahan, 47 Wyo. 208, 33 P.2d 1067 (1912).
124. See Spivak v. Sachs, supra note 116 (foreign state law); People v. Alfani,
supra note 116 (local state law).
125. See In re Bercu, 299 N.Y. 728, 87 N.E.2d 451 (1949) (federal tax law).
126. See In re Roel, 3 N.Y.2d 244, 144 N.E.2d 24, 165 N.Y.S.2d 31 (1957) (Mexican
law); Application of N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n, 207 Misc. 698, 139 N.Y.2d 714
(1955) (Mexican law).
127. See Spivak v. Sachs, supra note 116 (denying application of solitary incident
rule); Appell v. Reiner, 43 N.J. 313, 317-18, 204 A.2d 146, 149 (1964) (urging ap-
plication of solitary incident rule) (dissenting opinion); Bennett v. Goldsmith, 280
N.Y. 529, 19 N.E.2d 927 (1939) (applying solitary incident rule).
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is really not an exception at all, for it is based on the premise that the
practice permitted thereby does not constitute practice of law.
However, its scope is very limited. The solitary incident rule, for
example, will usually allow the preparation of a simple document
for a small fee,'128 but each incident must be isolated in order to be
legal;129 a continuous pattern of such interstate office practice is out-
side the rule. Furthermore, the rule will not permit a lengthy stay
in a state for the purpose of practicing law,130 nor the drawing of a
complex instrument,'3' nor any of the types of interstate practice asso-
ciated with the constant legal needs of today's interstate travelers.
Consequently, the solitary incident rule does not meet the needs of
modem corporate law practice.
The second exception-failure of a state to enforce its office practice
prohibitions against foreign attorneys132-is unsatisfactory because of
its uncertainty. Non-enforcement would be most likely if the client's
residence were out-of-state, the attorney's visit were of brief duration,
the transaction were of an interstate character, a change of attorneys
were impractical and would be detrimental to the client,133 and the
foreign attorney were limited to passive or consultative, rather than
active, functions.'3 The foreign attorney thus permitted to conduct
office practice is violating the literal language of the unauthorized
practice rules; but his immunity from prosecution results from a
recognition among members of the bar and state officials that present
rules governing office practice are inequitable for the foreign attorney
and should be only selectively enforced until the rules are revised.
However, such violations are still an adequate defense to a client sued
for services rendered.13
The first case that meets this problem squarely is Appell v. Reiner,3 '
128. See Bennett v. Goldsmith, supra note 127; People v. Title Guarantee & Trust
Co., 227 N.Y. 366, 371-72, 125 N.E. 666, 669 (1919).
129. People v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., supra note 128 at 373, 125 N.E. at
670 (concurring opinion).
130. See Spivak v. Sachs, supra note 116 (two-week stay outside of solitary incident
rule).
131. See People v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., supra note 129, at 371, 125 N.E. at
669 (Chattel mortgage and bill of sale).
132. See 78 HAiv. L. REv. 1651, 1653 (1965) (officials refrain from prosecuting);
31 S. CAL. L. REv. 416, 420 (1958) (describing questionnaires returned from eight
states and two cities reporting non-enforcement to prevent hardship).
133. See 31 S. CAL.. L. REv. 416, 420 (1958).
134. See 78 HAsv. L. R~v. 1651, 1653 (1965).
135. See Spivak v. Sachs, supra note 116. New York will also deny fees for office
practice outside the state. In Ginsberg v. Fahmey, 45 Misc. 2d 777, 258 N.Y.S.2d 43
(Sup. Ct. 1965), plaintiff, a Pennsylvania attorney, was denied compensation for office
services rendered in Illinois for a New York resident. Plaintiff was not qualified to
practice in Illinois, but the court seemed to base its decision also on his failure to
comply with New York law. See 45 Misc. 2d at 778, 258 N.Y.S.2d at 44. It is
doubtful that New York could establish its legislative jurisdiction over this practice.
136. Supra note 129.
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a recent decision by the New Jersey Supreme Court. Plaintiff, a New
York lawyer not admitted to the New Jersey bar, sought compensation
for services rendered defendants, two New Jersey residents. Plaintiff
had attempted to solve his clients' financial problems, which involved
numerous claims of New York and New Jersey creditors "so interwoven
as to constitute an inseparable whole." 137 The lower court denied
compensation, 1' finding that plantiff violated the state's unauthorized
practice law by not restricting his practice to New York claims.
Negotiations with the New Jersey creditors were held to have tainted
the entire relationship. The supreme court, per Justice Haneman,
reversed, recognizing that in circumstances such as these, it is in the
"public interest" to permit a foreign attorney to conduct office practice
in the state. Several preconditions were established for the operation
of the rule: the transaction involved must be of an interstate character;
the various state connections must be closely interrelated; the foreign
attorney must be admitted to the practice of law in one of the con-
nected states; the substitution of local counsel for the foreign attorney
for the local aspects of the transaction must be "grossly impractical
and inefficient;" the retention of additional counsel must in all proba-
bility result in aggregate fees in excess of the reasonable compensation
to which one attorney would legitimately be entitled; and no court
proceedings may be involved.13 9
Despite its numerous requirements, the Appell exception is a bold
and significant revision of modern office practice rules. The New
Jersey court displayed great creativity, citing no cases in its recogni-
tion of new law to fit the changing patterns of our federal system.
The New York Court of Appeals'4" has expressed its agreement with
the Appell decision, noting the danger that the law "be stretched to
outlaw customary and innocuous practices," and that it should not
penalize "every instance in which an attorney from another State
comes into our State for conferences or negotiations relating to a
New York client and a transaction somehow tied to New York."'
4'
Nevertheless, New York applied its unauthorized practice statute, and
denied compensation for legal advice given over a two-week period in
New York. It is hoped, however, that the way is now open for courts
of all the states to consider the validity of this true public interest in
interstate availability of office practitioners. 14
137. Appell v. Reiner, supra note 127, at 315, 204 A.2d at 147.
138. Appell v. Reiner, 81 N.J. Super. 229, 195 A.2d 310 (1963), rev'd, supra
note 127.
139. Appell v. Reiner, supra note 127, at 317, 204 A.2d at 148.
140. Spivak v. Sachs, supra note 116, at 168, 211 N.E.2d at 331, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 956.
141. Id.
142. The New Jersey Supreme Court has reaffirmed its position twice since its
decision in Appell, once by a rule of court recognizing the validity of payments to a
foreign attorney for services performed for estates probated in New Jersey, and the
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With the exception of New Jersey, then, the states provide little
relief for the foreign attorney desiring to engage in local office
practice. Unfortunately, federal law is presently no more helpful,
because most of the constitutional provisions relied upon to permit
appearance as of right in litigation are not applicable to office practice
situations.143 Any federal exceptions to the state office practice pro-
hibitions are only now reaching the formative stage. These exceptions
might perhaps be based upon the supremacy clause, the privileges and
immunities clause, and the public interest in representation by counsel,
expressed in the Button'Y and Brotherhood145 cases.
Office practice by foreign attorneys might be permitted under the
supremacy clause if some types of office practice could be deemed to
be controlled by federal law, either exclusively or concurrently with
the states. Some cases have indicated that such a federal area of
office practice may exist, but none have directly decided the point.
In Sperry v. Florida,46 the Supreme Court refused to enjoin a layman
authorized to practice before the United States Patent Office from
"performance of those services which are reasonably necessary and
incident to the preparation and prosecution of patent applications."'
147
State power over the practice of law, although legitimately exercised,
was required to yield to federal power since the state law was incon-
sistent with federal law.148 The practices involved included considera-
tion and advice as to the patentability of inventions and the advisabil-
ity of relying upon alternative forms of protection under state law, as
well as the actual drawing of patent applications and amendments.'49
The Court treated these services, however, as those directly related
to a federal administrative tribunal, much in the same manner that all
practice pursuant to proceedings before the federal courts is regarded
as independent of state control. The Court was careful to point out
that registration in the Patent Office "does not authorize the general
practice of patent law"150 and that state control is preserved "except
to the limited extent necessary for the accomplishment of federal
objectives."' 5 ' Rather than creating an area of federal office practice
other time in a decision implementing that rule of court. See In re Estate of Waring,
47 N.J. 367, 221 A.2d 193 (1966).
143. Unavailable are the right to appear pro se, the sixth and fourteenth amend-
ment rights to effective counsel and counsel of one's own choice, rights under the
full faith and credit clause, and the procedural due process guarantees.
144. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
145. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1
(1964). See text accompanying notes 83-87 supra.
146. 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
147. 373 U.S. at 386.
148. 373 U.S. at 384, citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824).
149. 373 U.S. at 383.
150. 373 U.S. at 386.
151. 373 U.S. at 402.
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within which qualified foreign attorneys could render legal services,
the Court merely carved out of state control the area surrounding a
to a federal administrative tribunal. This exemption of persons practic-
ing before such tribunals from state practice rules had earlier been
recognized in De Pass v. B. Harris Wool Co.152 There, a layman
licensed to practice before the Interstate Commerce Commission was
permitted to enforce his claims for services rendered before the I.C.C.
sitting in Missouri, although the state law forbade practice by laymen.
In re Bercu'53 is the only case decided thus far that has involved
an office practitioner of exclusively federal law. Bercu was a certified
public accountant who was found to have "practiced law" within New
York State in regard to federal tax matters. Without mentioning
possible federal jurisdiction, the court found defendant to be in con-
tempt and enjoined him from the practice of law. 54 In the absence of
any federal exercise of power, the decision is unquestionably proper.
However, it does not answer the question whether the federal govern-
ment may exercise its powers over such office practice without violat-
ing the tenth amendment. Sperry recognized such power over practice
as inherent in a federal administrative tribunal; whether some other
exercise of federal power, such as the creation of a single federal bar,
would displace state regulation of federal office practice is still
uncertain.
The desirability of recognizing federal office practice is another
matter. There is indeed a legitimate federal interest in determining
who may practice federal law; 55 and state admission requirements
are certainly inadequate as a guaranty of competent practitioners of
federal law. 5 6 Moreover, in office practice matters, there is not the
further check on a practitioner's qualifications which is available in
the federal courts. However, the problem of defining the boundaries
of federal office practice is not easily solved. The primary difficulty
would be with the large part of federal office practice that is closely
interrelated with state law matters. Counsel setting up a corporation
are concerned with state blue sky and incorporation laws at the same
time they are considering federal tax and securities regulations.
Distinguishing various segments of such an operation for admission
of foreign attorneys would be extremely impractical. Nevertheless,
federal law specialists such as antitrust, securities, taxation, or
152. 346 Mo. 1038, 144 S.W.2d 146 (1940).
153. In re Bercu, supra: note 125.
154. The fact that Bercu was a layman does not make the case inapplicable, since
New York treats foreign attorneys as laymen. See Spivak v. Sachs, supra note 116 at
168, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 956, 211 N.E.2d at 331.
155. See Sperry v. Florida, supra note 146, at 400-02; Spanos v. Skouras Theatres
Corp., 235 F. Supp. 1, 13-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd on rehearing, 364 F.2d 161
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 987 (1966).
156. See note 101 supra.
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patents5 7 experts, would seem to have a case for a single admission
under federal law. As in Bercu, though, state law probably will con-
tinue to govern even these areas of practice until the Congress acts.
Further problems will arise in the separation of office practice from
litigation practice. The federal antitrust counselor who shifts to work
upon prospective litigation would be practicing outside his federal
office practice haven. But at what point would he seek admission
to the court? Surely he cannot make application before a suit is filed;
and if the suit is settled prior to filing, what rules are to govern? After
the filing of the suit, compensation for his pre-filing services may
become contingent upon his admission to the court, since all such
services are then considered litigation services.158 In state courts
entertaining federal causes of action, a foreign attorney's inability to
be admitted could cost him a fee for services that would have been
legal if no suit had been filed. The likelihood of such an inconsistency
in the federal courts, however, is much less in light of the Second
Circuit's decision in Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp.,159 which al-
lowed compensation to an unadmitted foreign attorney for both pre-
filing and post-filing services. With a single federal bar for litigation
as well as office practice, of course, distinguishing office practice from
litigation practice would be unnecessary.
A second source for federal exceptions to state office practice pro-
hibitions might be the privileges and immunities clause, which was
recently used to permit representation by foreign counsel in federal
litigation involving a federal right. 60 It would seem that a client
acting in reliance upon federal law, and employing counsel for office
work to protect rights accorded by federal law, should have the same
right to employ an attorney lawfully admitted to practice in any other
state. For the most expert of all office practice is that which results
in such unambiguous relationships that litigation is never required.
A client seeking to file a registration statement under the Securities
Act of 1933 should not be restricted to local counsel for the filing, and
only be permitted foreign counsel when the registration statement is
challenged. Such instances suggest that one asserts his federal "rights"
in places other than the courtroom. And the privileges and immunities
157. Cf. D.N.J. R. 4(E) (recognizing special admission rules for patent attorneys,
although circumscribing them to such extent that their usefulness is extremely limited-
that is, such attorneys must maintain domicile in New Jersey).
158. See Tuppela v. Mathison, 291 F. 728, 730 (9th Cir. 1923) (recovery for
services rendered prior to litigation granted according to litigation practice rules).
159. 364 F.2d 161 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 987 (1966). The facts illus-
trating the periods in which the services were rendered are best seen in the district
court opinion, srupra note 155, at 6-7 (suit filed in June 1953; services began at least
by March 1953 and continued until October 1958).
160. Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., supra note 159, at 170.
1308 [ VOL. 20
clause perhaps extends a right of national citizenship to be free to
choose counsel from any state in such office practice situations.
The Button and Brotherhood cases indicate a third possible federal
exception to state office practice restrictions on the foreign attorney.
As has been noted,161 these cases shift to the states the burden of
showing that the substantive evils flowing from the allegedly wrongful
practices justify the restrictions imposed. When foreign attorneys who
specialize in federal law or the law of their own state engage in office
practice within their speciality, a state would have great difficulty in
demonstrating any prejudicial aspects of the arrangement. Indeed, it
is to the benefit of the resident client seeking advice on a merger,
for example, to engage the best federal antitrust lawyers available,
regardless of the bars to which those lawyers are admitted. 162 And
similar reasoning would sustain, as within the public interest, office
practice concerning their own substantive laws by foreign attorneys,
both of other American states and foreign nations. It is acknowledged
that a pressing need today is for more accurate and authoritative legal
advice on foreign law. 63 This extension of the Button and Brotherhood
rulings would provide the most sweeping of exceptions to the prohibi-
tions presently inhibiting representation by foreign attorneys in office
practice situations.
C. Policies Relevant to Office Practice Admission
The same broad policy relevant to all admissions of foreign attorneys
-that of the public interest-should guide the formulation and inter-
pretation of office practice rules. The strictness of state rules against
office practice by persons not admitted to the local bar has been
explained in terms of the absence of direct supervision by a court and
the resulting need for extraordinary precautions. The failure to dis-
tinguish office services of foreign attorneys from those of laymen had
led to this misconception. The client employing foreign counsel does
not usually run a high risk of incompetence, because he generally
employs foreign counsel according to reputation, satisfactory past
dealings, specialized abilities, or friendship'6-all of which reduce
161. See text accompanying notes 83-87 supra.
162. "The problem is by no means limited to anti-trust litigation; similar require-
ments for specialized legal services frequently arise as to federal rights relating to
such esoteric subjects as income taxation, patents, copyrights, trademarks, and se-
curities and labor regulation." Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., supra note 159, at 170.
163. See id.; Application of N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n, supra note 126 (Mexican
attorney to provide New York attorneys with advice on Mexican law); 31 S. CAL. L.
REv. 416, 421 (1958) (suggesting alternative means of providing legal advice where
physical presence is or is not required in foreign jurisdiction).
164. See In re Estate of Waring, supra note 142, at 373, 221 A.2d at 196 (New
York counsel, wvho had represented decedents financial matters for more than 50
years, not illegally practicing law in New Jersey in probate matter); Taft v. Amsel,
supra note 117 at 266, 180 A.2d at 756 ("former family relationship" with summer
neighbors); 78 HAnv. L. REv. 1651 (1965).
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the danger of incompetency. Unethical practices by such attorneys
are not subject to contempt proceedings, it is true. But those practices
would be a valid defense to a suit for services rendered, and could
be cause for both criminal and civil liability of the attorney. Service
of process presently is difficult to obtain, but some manner of sub-
stituted service of process, similar to that of the non-resident motor
vehicle statutes, might be validly based upon the performance of
legal services in the state. The real and vital public interest lies in
increased availability of foreign counsel, as shown in the foregoing
discussion of the growth of exceptions to the rigid office practice
prohibitions.
D. Conclusions Regarding Admission to Office Practice
The development of improved rules to govern the office practice
of law must begin with a view toward the policies behind restrictions
on such practice. "Public interest" should be regarded as a flexible
concept, subject to change in application as the balance between the
needs for local restrictions and freedom of interstate office practice
vary over time. Present distinctions between office practice and
litigation practice should be recognized, and the increasing need for
separate admission procedures for foreign office practitioners should
be stressed. In evaluating the plight of the foreign attorney, lay
practitioners should be excluded from consideration, thus acknowl-
edging the variance in public dangers from each group.
Admission rules for foreign office practitioners should exist at both
the local law and conflict of laws levels. Local admision rules should
first include pro-hac-vice-type procedures for office practices by
foreign attorneys.165 Local courts should be designated for the hear-
ing of applications for admission of foreign attorneys for particular
office practice problems. Second, the local rules of practice should
explicitly recognize a right of foreign attorneys to conduct office
practice in the jurisdiction where the interstate character of a problem
makes it impractical and inefficient to employ separate counsel for
each jurisdiction involved. Third, these local rules should contain
reciprocity provisions for office practice by lawyers from jurisdictions
permitting unrestricted conduct of foreign office practice by local
attorneys. Control over foreign attorneys conducting office practice
should be furthered by rules making the act of practicing law
within the state a basis of judicial jurisdiction, after appropriate
notice, as to any cause of action or complaint against the lawyer
arising out of his practice in the state.
165. As with litigation practice, these pro hac vice rules should not be limited to
American attorneys. Lawyers from foreign countries should be permitted to engage in
office practice through pro hac vice procedures, especially in light of the policy of
foreign nations' permitting American law firms to establish branch offices abroad.
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In addition to these revitalized local law rules of practice, courts
should recognize the conflict of laws aspects of admission of foreign
attorneys. In litigation practice, the vertical conflict of laws rule
has always been implied; the locus of performance of the services,
that is, in federal or state court, dictates the choice of the proper
local law governing admission.16 In office practice, the absence of an
entirely federal or state locus of performance requires that the vertical
choice of law turn on the content of the law to be practiced. Exclu-
sively federal law practice should be governed by federal rules of
practice, at least to the extent that the Congress acts to establish
admission procedures for federal office practice.
Horizontal conflict of laws rules should be developed for the states,
and in the absence of a federal bar, for the federal courts also. The
jurisdiction having the most significant contacts would seem most
qualified to apply its local rules of practice. Among the contacts which
could be considered would be the place where the most substantial
legal services were rendered, the residence of the client,167 the place
where the attorney-client relationship was established, and the juris-
diction in which the issue of unauthorized practice arose. An alter-
native place of reference test 168 might be used to uphold the validity
of the practice, if that practice is valid under the laws of any state
which has a "normal relation" to the practice.
VI. CoNcLusIoN
The public interest in interstate availability of legal services coupled
with the loss of vitality of protective local interests demand reevalua-
tion of the rules governing admission of foreign attorneys. Those
decision-making bodies charged with the duty of formulating and
applying these rules need a imiform framework within which to
assess each of the relevant considerations. It is submitted that these
considerations fall into four classifications-type of practice, locus
166. Under some circumstances, locus of performance is not even helpful in litigation
practice. Litigation began in state court may be removed to federal court, or a federal
court may refrain from passing on a state question and refer the case to state court.
See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, supra note 144 (federal suit; then state suit); Clay v.
Sun Ins. Oflfice Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960) (U.S. Sup. Ct. certified question to Fla.
Sup. Ct.). In the usual case, substitution of new counsel would be prejudicial to the
client; in such instances, continuation of the same counsel would seem to be a right
of the client; which right would pass to the attorney for purposes of admission.
167. In Ginsberg v. Fahrney, supra note 135, the court apparently considered the
client's New York residency, which was the sole contact with that state aside from the
attorney's suit to recover his fee, to be sufficient connection to apply New York law. If
the law of the place of performance (Illinois) had permitted such practice,- as it did
not, New York would probably have been acting beyond its legislative jurisdiction.
168. Cf. Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403 (1927); E. CEAT-
xrMM, PROBLEMS & M ETODS IN CONFLICT OF LAws 316-17 (1960).
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of performance, content of the law practiced, and status of the
practitioner.
69
The type of practice affected should be denominated as either office
practice or litigation practice, with recognition given to the lack of
procedural means for admission of foreign office practitioners as well
as the dangers that accrue in the presence or absence of a supervisory
tribunal. Further, civil and criminal litigation should be distinguished,
with the special rules and policies that attach to the latter thus
noted.
Locus of performance and content of the law practiced should assist
in the indication of authoritative sources for litigation and office
practice rules respectively. Generally, locus of performance will con-
clusively establish whether federal or state law will govern admission
to litigation.170 In office practice situations, the only guideline for
finding an area of federal practice within the broad reach of state
law is through the content of the law practiced. Exclusively federal
practice over which Congress has exercised its concurrent powers will
unquestionably indicate a federal authoritative source. Once the
authoritative source for a particular situation has been determined,
relevant policies bearing upon admission of foreign attorneys should
be more clearly delineated.
In determining the status of the practitioner concerned, courts and
legislatures should first distinguish between lay practitioners and
foreign attorneys, and then proceed to an examination of the false
assumption of danger to the public, which has so inhibited the
growth of interstate practice by foreign attorneys. Among the attor-
neys considered, distinctions as to residency should be eliminated,
and emphasis shifted instead to factors indicating competency and
integrity. Thus, bar membership and extent of active practice would
seem relevant considerations. Discrimination against lawyers from
foreign nations should be eliminated, with association rules being
enacted where necessary to ensure effective representation of the
client. In sum, admission rules should consider the interest of clients
in being free to select their legal counsel-and their freedom should
not be unduly impaired.
WILLIAM E. FLOWERS
169. Two other considerations might be the nature of the client and the forum in
which the issue of unauthorized practice arises. Neither should be relevant, but each
may in fact have some significance. For example, under the Spanos use of the privileges
and immunities clause, some distinction may be required between corporate and
individual clients. And occasionally a strong policy of the forum, especially as reflected
in a choice of law rule, may determine the result in a particular instance. Cf. Ginsberg
v. Fabrney, supra note 135.
170. See note 166 supra.
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